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The Sidis Case and the Origins of Modern Privacy Law
Samantha Barbas*
In the years before World War I, William James Sidis was widely regarded as
the most impressive child prodigy the world had ever seen. Sidis attended Harvard
at age eleven, spoke several languages, and was a mathematical genius.1 By 1909,
he was an international celebrity, publicized in media around the world and
renowned for his intellectual feats.2 A Washington Post headline pronounced him a
“boy wonder.”3
Yet as an adult, Sidis’s life took a different turn. He neglected his mathematical
talents and entirely retreated from public life.4 By the age of twenty, Sidis had
become a recluse.5 At thirty-nine, he was an adding-machine operator living alone
in a shabby Boston rooming house.6 Sidis was awkward and unkempt.7 He
devoted his free time to collecting streetcar transfers and trivia about an obscure
Native American tribe.8 The New Yorker tracked him down in his apartment,
interviewed him, and wrote a story about his failure to live up to his potential.9 The
piece, published in the magazine in 1937, described his personal eccentricities in
vivid detail. Humiliated and outraged, Sidis sued under the tort of invasion of
privacy by public disclosure of private facts—the original Warren and Brandeis
conception of the “right to privacy,” which permits damages to be awarded for the
dignitary harms caused by the publication of true but embarrassing private
information.10 Sidis lost; according to the court, he had no right to conceal his
private life from a public that was curious about him.11 “Regrettably or not,” wrote
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a groundbreaking opinion that celebrated
freedom of the press over privacy, “the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and
*

Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. J.D. Stanford Law

1. Jared L. Manley, Where are They Now? April Fool!, NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1937, at 22.
2. AMY WALLACE, THE PRODIGY: A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM J. SIDIS, AMERICA’S GREATEST
CHILD PRODIGY 51–53 (1986).
3. This Eight Year Old Boy Wonder Finds Mathematics Too Simple, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1906.
4. Manley, supra note 1, at 24.
5. Id. at 23–4.
6. Id. at 25–26.
7. Id. at 26.
8. Id. at 24–26.
9. See Manley, supra note 1.
10. See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); Samuel Warren & Louis
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The description of the tort as the tort of
“public disclosure of private facts” was coined by William L. Prosser in Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
392 (1960).
11. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
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‘public figures’” were subjects of interest to the public, “[a]nd when such are the
mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in
the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day.”12
The American press, it has been said, is freer to invade personal privacy than
perhaps any other in the world.13 The tort law of privacy, as a shield against
unwanted media exposure, is very weak.14 The media in the U.S. have a degree of
latitude to report on intimate matters, without the threat of legal liability, that would
be unimaginable in many other countries. In England, model Naomi Campbell
won damages against a magazine when it published the details of her treatment for
drug addiction.15 Princess Caroline of Monaco obtained a judgment from the
European Court of Human Rights preventing the German press from publishing
paparazzi photos of her.16 In the U.S., by contrast, public figures have been held to
have almost no legal right to privacy.17 Courts have considered almost anything
that takes place in a public place, or that could be said to shed light on an issue of
public curiosity or significance, to be exempt from liability for invasion of
privacy.18 The personal details and photographs of a rape victim, images of the
extrication of a woman from a crashed car and a photograph of a soccer player with
his genitalia exposed are among the intimacies that have been held to be
newsworthy “matters of public interest” and thus nonactionable under privacy
law.19
The failure of American law to protect personal life from unwanted publicity has
been poorly explained. The standard reason given for the weakness of American

12.
13.

Id.
See, e.g., ROBIN BARNES, OUTRAGEOUS INVASIONS: CELEBRITIES’ PRIVATE LIVES, MEDIA,
AND THE LAW (2010); Brian C. Murchison, Revisiting the American Action for Public Disclosure of
Private Facts, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 32 (Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds., 2006); James Q. Whitman, The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
14. Currently, in most states, it constitutes a tort to publicly disclose “matter concerning the
private life of another” if it “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person” and the matter is not
“newsworthy,” a matter of “public interest” or “of legitimate concern to the public.” See Jonathan
Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Public Domain, 55 MD. L.
REV. 425, 426, 436, 441, 442 (1996). Because of the courts’ expansive reading of the newsworthiness
or “public interest” privilege, the “public disclosure” tort has been described as effectively “dead.” See
id.
15. Sarah Hall & Clare Dyer, Legal Landmark as Naomi Campbell Wins Privacy Case,
GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2002, at 1.
16. Chris Tryhorn, Princess Wins Landmark Privacy Ruling, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2004, 10:44
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/jun/24/royalsandthemedia.privacy.
17. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that without a showing of
actual malice, a public official cannot recover in a libel action); Curtis Publ’g v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) (extending the Sullivan rule to “public figures,” in this case a football coach).
18. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren & Brandeis’s
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 353 (1983) (noting that “the vast majority of cases seem to hold
that what is printed is by definition of legitimate public interest”); Mintz, supra note 14, at 439–40.
19. See Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 26 Media L. Rep. 1604 (10th Cir. 1998); Ross v. Midwest
Commc’ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 1989); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., 955 P.2d. 469 (Cal.
1998); Pasadena Star News v. Superior Court of L.A., 249 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. App. 1991).
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privacy law as a bar on the publication of private information is the strong tradition
of First Amendment freedom.20 But freedom of the press alone cannot explain why
the right to publish has been interpreted as a right to print truly intimate matters or
the right to thrust people into the spotlight against their will. Especially during a
time of heightened concerns with privacy and Internet overexposure, we need a
better explanation as to why the law has struck the balance between media
exposure and privacy in the way that it has. One answer, this Article argues, can be
found in the case of William James Sidis.
The 1940 case Sidis v. F.R. Publishing, one of the best-known privacy cases in
U.S. history, represents a foundational moment in the development of American
privacy law.21 Sidis established the normative and doctrinal bases for the tort law
of privacy as it currently exists.22 Sidis was the first case since the origin of the
privacy tort in the 1890s to address the conflict between the right to privacy and
freedom of the press and to come out on the side of free expression.23 In a
conclusion that became the guiding principle of modern privacy doctrine, the
Second Circuit held that the loss of Sidis’s privacy was an inevitable sacrifice to be
made for The New Yorker’s right to publish freely and the public’s “right to
know”—its right to access a broad range of information, a domain of knowledge
nearly as expansive as its curiosities.24 In an insight that is now unexceptional but
that was forward-looking at the time, the Sidis court suggested that the ability to
obtain facts of all kinds through the mass media, from serious news to even gossip
and trivia, is the right and prerogative of a democratic people.25
The Sidis case represented a bridge between earlier, nineteenth century views
and modern, twentieth century perspectives on the legitimacy and constitutionality
of legal restrictions on publishing private information. The court’s subordination
of Sidis’s privacy to freedom of the press revealed the influence of a nascent civil
libertarian First Amendment jurisprudence in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as an
emerging social philosophy in that era—now common to the discourse on
democracy and mass communications—that access to the “news,” broadly defined,
is a prerequisite to social and political participation in a democratic society.26 In its

20. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27
NOVA L. REV. 289, 291 (2002); Whitman, supra note 13, at 1209; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 293.
21. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law
Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 999 (1989); Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 323.
22. Whitman, supra note 13, at 1209 (explaining that since Sidis, “American law began . . . to
favor the interests of the press at the cost of almost any claim to privacy”).
23. Id.; see also WALLACE, supra note 2, at 236 (“‘The article . . . was to become forever
celebrated in legal and publishing circles everywhere because of the important precedent established by
the courts, affecting all so-called ‘right of privacy’ cases. . . . The great importance of the Sidis case lies
in its having become the principal authority in all similar cases in which the right of privacy is claimed
by a person who is, or once was, a notable public figure.’” (quoting JAMES THURBER, THE YEARS WITH
ROSS 210–12 (1959))).
24. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (“Everyone will agree that at
some point the public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the individual’s desire
for privacy.”).
25. Id.
26. See generally THE COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS
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suggestion that the public’s right to learn about the private life of the former genius
was more valuable than his right to be let alone, and in its celebration of the free
flow of facts, no matter how trivial or banal, the Second Circuit articulated what
have, over time, become the ground rules for the modern information society.27
The story of the Sidis case has something to tell us not only about the
development of privacy law but also about the culture of privacy, the public
attitudes and sensibilities that have framed and shaped the law of privacy. It has
often been said that Americans—exhibitionists to the core—do not really want
privacy and are indifferent about having their secrets revealed.28 We are voyeurs
who are happy to peer into others’ personal lives and care little about the privacy
rights of others.29 The public reaction to the Sidis decision belies this conclusion.
Despite enthusiasm for the kind of gossip and human interest journalism purveyed
by The New Yorker, the outcome in Sidis was attacked by the public. Critics
argued that The New Yorker and the courts had deprived Sidis of core personal
rights—his right to control his public identity, his right to seek anonymity and his
right to be forgotten.30 The public response to Sidis thus illustrates not so much
public distaste for privacy, but rather confusion and tension—we want our gossip
and our privacy, too.
This Article, then, explores the Sidis case as a fundamental and transformative
episode in the law and culture of privacy. It turns to the case in an attempt to
explain why American privacy law since the 1940s has, in a rather systematic way,
vaunted freedom of the press and the public’s “right to know” over the individual’s
right to control her public image and to stay out of the spotlight.31 Through Sidis,
this Article also explores the enduring paradox of American privacy—the public’s
desire to peer into others’ private lives, and at the same time, its belief that every
person should have a right to control her image and to stay out of the public eye if
she truly desires. This Article presents Sidis as not only a legal case but a public
event—one that garnered substantial public attention and became the focal point of
debates over privacy and public exposure. Sidis brought the tensions and
contradictions around privacy to the forefront of popular consciousness and
established the terms of the social dialogue around privacy that would surface in
the latter part of the twentieth century.
Part I provides the background to the Sidis case. It tells the story of William
James Sidis and his rise to fame as a child prodigy in the early twentieth century—a
period that saw the emergence of the modern mass media and celebrity culture.
The sad story of Sidis, who was thrust into the media spotlight through no fault of
his own, was a testament to what many at the time rightly observed to be the
(1947).
27. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
28. See, e.g., JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 202
(2008); Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan.
10, 2010, 8:58 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy.
29. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 28; Johnson, supra note 28.
30. See infra note 400, 433 and accompanying text.
31. See Post, supra note 21, at 1003 (noting that “the development of the law has in general”
supported the reasoning in Sidis); Whitman, supra note 13, at 1209; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 293.
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precarious nature of privacy in an age of mass communications. Part II, drawing
on previously unexplored archival sources, narrates the largely unknown history of
the Sidis litigation, a saga involving some of the most esteemed jurists in the
country, the most prestigious First Amendment lawyers of the day and an eccentric
plaintiff with a personal vendetta against the press. In Sidis, the Second Circuit
initiated what is still the reigning balancing approach to cases involving invasions
of privacy by publication. In each case, the individual’s privacy interest is weighed
against the public’s interest in access to private facts, a balance in which the public
interest usually wins.32 The Sidis court also inaugurated what remains the
dominant “leave it to the press” approach to determining the important “public
figure” and “public interest” privileges to the privacy tort.33 The New Yorker
brought Sidis into the spotlight, then pointed to the interest it had generated to
successfully argue that Sidis was a “public figure,” thus making the details of his
private life a “matter of public interest” and the article exempt from liability for
invasion of privacy.34
Part III explores the response to Sidis as a demonstration of the tension, unease
and confusion around privacy that remains a feature of our national psyche and
cultural landscape. Though the New Yorker article was widely read and apparently
enjoyed, at the same time, the public expressed overwhelming sympathy for Sidis
and vocally questioned the court’s conclusion that freedom of the press
encompassed a right to publish and consume gossip and the intimate details of
personal life.35 The Conclusion examines the enduring legacy of the case. The
Sidis Court validated trends in popular publishing that turned personal humiliation
into an object of mass consumption, and it paved the legal pathway for increasingly
sensationalistic journalism in the postwar era. Most of the post-World War II case
law on tort liability for the publication of embarrassing private facts is based on the
doctrines and principles articulated in Sidis—principles that have gone largely
unquestioned, but that perhaps now require reconsideration.36 The rise of the
Internet, with its near-infinite capacity to remember, gives new meaning and
salience to Sidis’s claim to a legal right to be forgotten.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF WILLIAM JAMES SIDIS
A. THE BOY WONDER
Between 1910 and 1920, William James Sidis was regarded as “one of the most
remarkable boy prodigies of whom there is record.”37 Sidis, a self-taught polyglot
32. See id. at 353; see also Whitman, supra note 13, at 1209.
33. Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 353.
34. See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Brief for DefendantAppellee at 13–14, 23, Sidis, 113 F.2d 806 (No. 400).
35. On circulation of The New Yorker, see infra notes 109 and accompanying text.
36. See WALLACE, supra note 2, at 236; Post, supra note 21, at 1003; Whitman, supra note 13, at
1209.
37. Frank Fleischman, A Boy Prodigy and the Fourth Dimension, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 15,
1910, at 9.
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and mathematical genius, was celebrated in books, periodicals, songs and art of the
era.38 He could read and spell before the age of three, and, at four, use a
typewriter.39 In grade school his mastery of complex mathematics approached the
level of Harvard professors.40 It was speculated that his IQ was near 250. His feats
were written up in the newspapers of the world, and his image graced magazine
covers.41 Sidis’s rise to prominence occurred during the early years of modern
celebrity culture, when fame and media publicity were often described as the
pinnacle of success and prestige.42 For Sidis, celebrity was not a fantasy but a
nightmare. He had no desire to be famous. The “perfect life,” he often said, was to
live in complete and utter seclusion.43
William James Sidis was born to Jewish Ukrainian immigrants on April 1, 1898,
in New York.44 His father, Boris Sidis, had emigrated in 1886 to escape political
persecution, and his mother, Sarah Mandelbaum Sidis, had emigrated not long
thereafter.45 Boris Sidis earned his degrees at Harvard and taught there, while
performing pioneering work in abnormal psychology.46 William was named after
his godfather, Boris’ friend and colleague, the American philosopher William
James.47
Young William became a specimen for Boris’ psychological
investigations.48 Boris trained William to spell and read at a very young age. Sidis
could read the New York Times at 18 months.49 At five, he composed a treatise on
anatomy.50 When he was eight, he worked out a new system of logarithms based
on twelve instead of ten.51 Boris published several papers in scientific journals
describing his son’s achievements and a book, Philistine and Genius, which used
William’s success story to praise homeschooling and critique the deficiencies of
American public education.52
By the time Philistine and Genius was published in 1911, William was well
known to the American public. William had literally grown up before the media
spotlight. When Sidis was three or four, his feats of memory were featured in the
popular magazine North American Review.53 At the age of six, he was sent to a
38. H. Addington Bruce, Bending the Twig, AM. MAGAZINE, Mar. 1910, at 692 [hereinafter
Bruce, Bending the Twig] (explaining that once Sidis’ interest was aroused, he was not content until he
had learned the exact nature of whatever had excited his curiosity).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 690–95.
41. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 60.
42. On the origins of modern celebrity culture, see generally CHARLES L. PONCE DE LEON, SELFEXPOSURE: HUMAN INTEREST JOURNALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF CELEBRITY IN AMERICA, 1890–
1940 (2002).
43. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 106.
44. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 1–20.
45. Id. at 2–9.
46. See id. at 11–18.
47. Manley, supra note 1, at 22.
48. Id.
49. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 23.
50. Manley, supra note 1, at 22.
51. Id.
52. WALLACE, supra note 2; BORIS SIDIS, PHILISTINE AND GENIUS (1911).
53. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 27.
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Brookline public school and went through seven years of schooling in six months.54
Accounts of his grammar school days were written up in the Boston Transcript and
the Boston Herald.55 When he briefly attended high school, he was hounded by
reporters. According to Sidis biographer Amy Wallace, “if [reporters] succeeded in
finding him alone, one would pounce and hold him while another took his
picture.”56
What really brought William into the public eye was his enrollment at Harvard
at the age of eleven. Sidis set a record in 1909 by becoming the youngest person to
enroll at that university in its history. His story was splashed across the front pages
of the nation’s newspapers. The press offered predictions for a brilliant future—
that the “boyish hand busily writing examination papers today at Harvard may well
be ordained to push away the veil from some great fact or some mighty truth for
which the world is waiting.”57 When young Sidis lectured to an audience of
professors at the Harvard mathematical club on his theory of four-dimensional
bodies, he became a true celebrity. Newspapers across the country assigned
reporters to cover “the Sidis case.”58
The press was fascinated with the nature-versus-nurture question—was Sidis
naturally brilliant, or was his father’s rigorous training behind his success? It was
reported that Sidis was a testament to innovative child rearing methods, and that he
was a “normal boy trained from his earliest years to think vigorously.”59 “Young
Sidis has not been pushed or forced by a proud family, and he has been educated in
a rather special way,” wrote the New York Times.60 “His father has from the
earliest years trained the boy to reason . . . .”61 Dozens of newspaper editorials and
educational articles between 1910 and 1912 used Sidis as evidence to show that
public schools were “wasting time, fostering bad habits and in general doing more
harm than good.”62 The fact that Sidis was able to master such complex topics at a
young age “shows too plainly that our methods of education are slipping.”63
William’s supporters went to great lengths to demonstrate that despite his
genius, he was still a normal child. There were extensive discussions in the press
of his personality and home life. Apart from his genius, he was an average boy,

54. Bruce, Bending the Twig, supra note 38, at 692.
55. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 35–38.
56. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 44–45; see also This Eight-Year-Old Boy Wonder Finds
Mathematics “Too Simple,” WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1906, at A5 (illustrating that reporters hounded Sidis).
57. A Savant at Thirteen, Young Sidis on Entering Harvard Knows More Than Many on Leaving.
A Scholar at Three, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1907, at SM9 [hereinafter A Savant at Thirteen]; see also Boy
Mathematician Astounds Educators, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1910, at 7; Sidis Could Read at Two Years Old,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1909, at 7; Sidis of Harvard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1909, at 6.
58. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 60; Sidis Is Pythagoras, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1910, at 110.
59. Sidis of Harvard, supra note 57.
60. A Savant at Thirteen, supra note 57, at SM9.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., H. Addington Bruce, Intensive Child Culture, WASH. POST, May 12, 1912, at SM3
[hereinafter Bruce, Intensive Child Culture]; Frederic J. Haskin, New Ideas in Education, WASH. POST,
Feb. 23, 1910, at 4.
63. Bruce, Intensive Child Culture, supra note 62; Haskin, supra note 62.
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explained one article.64 “As a pastime, in order to vary the monotony of studying
logarithms and the like, [he] enjoys reading Alice in Wonderland. . . . In the
manner of playing games, marbles . . . skipping rope . . . and the like, the boy is
perfectly at home, and enjoys a game of ball with boys of his age immensely.”65
“[T]here is no evidence that his studies have undermined his health. On the
contrary, he seems to enjoy enviable bodily vigor.”66 William was not only
brilliant, Boris had written in Philistine and Genius, but “healthy, strong, and
sturdy,” “brimming over with humor and fun,” and with cheeks that “glow with
health.”67
Yet others doubted the “rosy cheeks of the little Sidis boy.”68 While many
observers predicted “wonderful achievements in the years to come,” the future
mental health of child prodigies was still being debated.69 Commentators described
Sidis as the product of a “scientific forcing experiment.”70 A 1911 article in
Science Magazine, titled Popular Misconceptions Concerning Precocity in
Children, feared that false reports that William was well adjusted and had not been
“robbed of [his] childhood” would lead to similar, and ultimately damaging, efforts
by parents to home-grow their own geniuses.71
These pessimistic assessments were probably more accurate. William James
Sidis was not a healthy boy. Even more destructive than the pressure from his
father was the constant hounding by the press. Sidis was naturally reclusive.72 He
hated publicity, and he sought refuge from the media attention in his studies.73 Yet,
as his biographer writes, “[t]he more he hungered for privacy, the more famous he
became, and the more reporters hounded him.”74 The result was a nervous
breakdown in 1910, not long after the famous Math Club lecture.75
The breakdown was widely publicized. Newspapers reported that William was
“seriously ill,” and there were rumors that he would never return to Cambridge to
complete his studies.76 Friends of the family asserted that “too great mental

64. See Harvard’s Quartet of Mental Prodigies: Unique Problem for Psychologists in Education
of Young Sidis and His Three Companions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1910, at SM11 [hereinafter Harvard’s
Quartet].
65. Id.
66. The Boy Prodigy of Harvard, 48 CURRENT LITERATURE 291 (1910); Wonderful Boys of
History, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1910, at M2.
67. SIDIS, supra note 52, at 88.
68. See WALLACE, supra note 2, at 61.
69. Harvard’s Quartet, supra note 64, at SM11; Hannah Mitchell, Prodigies Turn Out Well in
Later Years, Say Psychologists: Mistake to Think Phenomenons Failures as Grown-Ups Provision
Should Be Made for Extra Talented, N.Y. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1921, at E10.
70. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 53.
71. V. O’Shea, Popular Misconceptions Concerning Precocity in Children, 34 SCIENCE 666,
667–68 (1911); see also Joseph F. Kett, Curing the Disease of Precocity, 84 AM. J. SOC. S183, S206
(1978).
72. See WALLACE, supra note 2, at 54.
73. See id. at 55.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 68–71.
76. Fear is Felt for Sidis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1910, at 1.
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exertion” had a “great deal to do with the boy’s sudden collapse.”77 His father was
running a sanatorium in Portsmouth, New Hampshire at the time, and William was
rushed off there. When he finally came back to Harvard, he was retiring and shy.
He could not lecture again, and he began to show a marked distrust of people and a
fear of responsibility.78
But the media interest in Sidis did not relent. Shortly after his graduation from
Harvard, he granted an in-depth interview to the Boston Herald. The interviewer
delved into the subject of sixteen-year-old Sidis’s sex life and got Sidis to explain
in detail his “solemn vow of celibacy.”79 The New York Times got hold of the
revealing interview, and before long, other media outlets were commenting on his
celibacy vows and joking about it.80 After graduation, Sidis took a graduate
student teaching position in mathematics at Rice University in Houston.81 News of
his escapades in Texas—in particular, his social blunders—was channeled back to
the major East Coast papers.82 The Boston Herald, Chicago Journal and New York
Times, among other outlets, ran stories about Sidis’s bad manners, his awkwardness
with women, and how he was mercilessly teased by his fellow students.83
Depressed, Sidis was let go from Rice and came back to Boston, where he enrolled
at Harvard Law School.84 For unknown reasons he dropped out during his third
year.85
He fell out of the media spotlight briefly, until 1919, when he was arrested for
participating in a socialist demonstration in which he had carried the hated red
flag.86 “He was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for inciting to riot[] and
assault” but was eventually released on 5,000 dollars bail.87 The media covered the
arrest and trial. “Evidently intellectual prodigy,” quipped one journal, “is not
always a moral prodigy.” The publicity put Sidis back into his parents’ sanatorium.
In his early twenties, he emerged from their care and took up life on his own.88
Sidis then “drifted from city to city,” working for subsistence wages as a clerk.89
In 1924, a reporter found him working in an office on Wall Street for 23 dollars a

77. Id.
78. WALLACE, supra note 2 at 53.
79. Id. at 107.
80. See id. at 111; Harvard’s Prodigy at Figures, Aged 17, Takes Vow of Celibacy, WASH. POST,
Apr. 18, 1915, at 9; Prodigy of Harvard Vows Not to Wed—He’s Only 17, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1915, at
1.
81. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 112.
82. Id. at 111–15.
83. Id. at 111; see also LEON GUERARD, PERSONAL EQUATION 220 (1948). At Rice he was
“treated like a two-headed calf. His boyish singularities were . . . mercilessly exposed and amplified.
Because he blurted out that he had never kissed a girl, he was made the butt of endless practical jokes.”
GUERARD, supra, at 220.
84. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 120, 135.
85. Id. at 135.
86. See Graduate of Harvard, Believer in the Soviet, Given Prison Sentence, ATLANTA CONST.,
May 14, 1919, at 20; Youngest Graduate of Harvard is Sentenced, N.Y. TRIB., May 14, 1919, at 6.
87. Manley, supra note 1, at 23.
88. See id. at 25.
89. Id. at 24.
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week, and the news made headlines.90 The New York Herald Tribune exposed his
identity in an article titled Boy Brain Prodigy of 1909 Now $23-a-Week Adding
Machine Clerk.91
The reporter wrote of the “tragedy that young Sidis
represents.”92 The article prompted a snide editorial in the New York Times called
Precocity Doesn’t Wear Well, which stated, “the mental fires that burned so
brightly have died down, to all appearances.”93 One article, Is It Too Bad If Your
Child’s a Prodigy?, described Sidis’s upbringing as a “sad mistake.”94 Sidis’s
rediscovery, according to the Educational Review, led to a “perfect orgy of . . .
triumph” by those who had criticized the overambitious parents of precocious
children.95
After this first “rediscovery,” Sidis plunged back into anonymity. In 1926, he
published a book on his hobby of collecting streetcar transfers, titled Notes on the
Collection of Transfers, under a pseudonym, Frank Folupa.96 He continued to
work as a clerk and boasted of his “ability to operate an adding machine with great
speed and accuracy.”97 He had what biographer Wallace described as a
“comfortable existence” out of the spotlight.98 He studied and wrote on a variety of
unusual topics, including the Okamakammesset Indian tribe.99 From his rented
room in a Boston boardinghouse, he gave lectures to friends on his various bizarre
interests.100 He was well liked, though eccentric—unkempt, talkative and
graceless.101 He also demonstrated a resentment of his genius past. When his
father died in 1923, he did not attend his funeral.102 He never stayed long at any
one job, because one of his coworkers inevitably found out that he was the famous
boy wonder, and he could not tolerate the job after that.103
B. APRIL FOOL: THE NEW YORKER AND REDISCOVERY
In August 1937, Sidis’s carefully built “fortress” of anonymity came under siege
when The New Yorker magazine published an article about him.104 The story, titled
Where are They Now? April Fool!, was presented as an intimate, first-hand
account of Sidis as observed by a visitor to his apartment.105 The article was

90. Boy, Once Brain Wonder, Now a New York Clerk, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1924, at 9.
91. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 170–71.
92. Id.
93. Precocity Doesn’t Wear Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1924, at 16.
94. Is It Too Bad If Your Child’s a Prodigy?, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 17, 1924, at F3.
95. Pathetic Fiction, 67 EDUC. REV. 158 (June 1924); see also Sidis Hated His Father, Feels that
He Was Treated Harshly as a Boy, BOS. DAILY GLOBE, Jan. 11, 1924, at 22A.
96. See WALLACE, supra note 2, at 181–82
97. Manley, supra note 1, at 25.
98. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 166.
99. Manley, supra note 1, at 26.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 25–26.
102. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 166–67.
103. See Manley, supra note 1, at 26.
104. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 228.
105. See id. at 229.
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entertaining, well written and had “considerable popular news interest.”106 It was
also snide, mocking and condescending. But that was par for the course for the
magazine, which advertised itself as sophisticated and witty, fashionably avantgarde and “not meant for ‘your old aunt in Dubuque.’”107
Started in 1925, The New Yorker had become one of the nation’s best-known
magazines of literary and feature journalism, with a staff that included some of the
most talented writers of the day.108 Between 1930 and 1940, the magazine was
experiencing phenomenal growth. In 1937, its circulation was 133,000; it would
gain an additional 15,000 by 1940.109 As one journalism historian writes, “[n]ot
long after its inception . . . , the magazine began to distinguish itself through its . . .
profiles,” “long-form literary journalism” and “storytelling reportage.”110 It was
not a highbrow publication by any means, but it was not a tabloid, either; it
published material in the grey zone between serious literature, hard news and
lightweight feature stories and gossip.111 In this way, it was very much like other
magazines and newspapers of the time, with their focus on “human interest.”
Though “human interest” journalism—described by one publisher as “chatty little
reports of tragic or comic incidents in the lives of the people”112 —had originated in
the early nineteenth century, it was not until the turn of the century that it became a
standard component of daily and weekly periodicals.113 The distinguishing feature
of human interest reporting or “personality journalism,” as it was sometimes called,
was its focus on the lifestyles, activities and personal traits of famous and not-sofamous individuals.114 Unlike “informational” or hard news reporting, the purpose
of human interest journalism was to entertain by telling stories about people—a
genre that by its very nature ran the risk of invading privacy.115
In 1937 the magazine was running a Where Are they Now? series, profiles of
“once famous front-page figures who had been lost to public view for considerable
lengths of time.”116 The series played on the public’s fascination with has-beens,
the casualties of celebrity culture and the fickleness of fame. A New Yorker
reporter, Barbara Linscott, interviewed Sidis in his apartment.117 James Thurber,
106. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
107. KATHY ROBERTS FORDE, LITERARY JOURNALISM ON TRIAL 9–10, 40–41 (2008); Wilfred
Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 718 (July 1948).
108. See id.
109. BEN YAGODA, ABOUT TOWN: THE NEW YORKER AND THE WORLD IT MADE 96 (2000); see
also DAVID E. SUMNER, THE MAGAZINE CENTURY: AMERICAN MAGAZINES SINCE 1900 77 (2010).
110. FORDE, supra note 107, at 9–10, 41.
111. See generally YAGODA, supra note 109.
112. HELEN MACGILL HUGHES, NEWS AND THE HUMAN INTEREST STORY: A STUDY OF POPULAR
LITERATURE 13 (1940).
113. Helen MacGill Hughes, Human Interest Stories and Democracy, PUB. OPINION Q., Apr. 1937,
at 76–78.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. JAMES THURBER, THE YEARS WITH ROSS 210 (1959).
117. See Letter from Ik Shuman, Editor, The New Yorker, to Alexander Lindey, Partner,
Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst (Sept. 6, 1930) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and
Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library); Letter from Ik Shuman, Editor, The New Yorker, to Alexander
Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst (Aug. 11, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives,
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the noted cartoonist, humorist, and essayist, did the rewrite, and the article bears his
pen name, “Jared L. Manley.”118 The famed writer and critic A.J. Liebling also
contributed to the piece.119
“William James Sidis lives today at the age of thirty-nine, in a hall bedroom of
Boston’s shabby south end,” Manley wrote.120 The reporter found him “in a small
room papered with a design of huge, pinkish flowers, considerably discolored”:121
William Sidis at thirty-nine is a large, heavy man, with a prominent jaw, a thickish
neck, and a reddish mustache . . . . He seems to have difficulty in finding the right
words to express himself, but when he does, he speaks rapidly, nodding his head
jerkily to emphasize his points, gesturing with his left hand, uttering occasionally a
curious, gasping laugh. He seems to get a great and ironic enjoyment out of leading a
life of wandering irresponsibility after a childhood of scrupulous regimentation. His
visitor found in him a certain childlike charm.122

The piece noted that Sidis was employed as a clerk and that he sought such
menial work because he refused to make use of his talents.123 “The very sight of a
mathematical formula makes me physically ill,” he had reportedly said.124 “All I
want to do is run an adding machine . . . .”125 He said he did not stay long at one
job because one of his fellow employees found that he was the former “boy
wonder,” and he became so uncomfortable that he had to leave.126 When a person
asked him “point-blank about his infant precocity, and insisted on a demonstration
of his mathematical prowess, Sidis was restrained with difficulty from throwing
him out of the room.”127
The article also lampooned his obsessions with streetcar transfers and the history
“He has written some booklets on
of the Okamakammesset tribe.128
Okamakammesset lore and history, and if properly urged, will recite
Okamakammesset poetry and even sing Okamakammesset songs. He admitted that
his study of the Okamakammessets is an outgrowth of his interest in Socialism.”129
The reporter brought up the prediction of a professor of MIT in 1910 that he would
be a great mathematician and a famous leader in the world of science.130 “It’s
Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
118. Letter from Ik Shuman, Editor, The New Yorker, to Harriet Pilpel, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff
& Ernst (Aug. 22, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y.
Pub. Library); Anthony Lewis, The Right to Be Let Alone, in JOURNALISM AND THE DEBATE OVER
PRIVACY 61, 63 (Craig LaMay ed., 2003) (noting that Thurber used the pseudonym Jared Manley in the
Sidis article and that Thurber did not interview Sidis).
119. Letter from Ik Shuman to Harriet Pilpel, supra note 118.
120. Manley, supra note 1, at 25.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 26.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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strange,” he said with a grin, “but, you know, I was born on April Fools’ Day.”131
Thurber claimed that he had wanted to use the article to make a point; he had
hoped that “that the piece would help to curb the great American thrusting of
talented children into the glare of fame or notoriety, a procedure in so many cases
disastrous to the later career and happiness of the exploited youngsters.”132 And
yet the piece did exactly that—it thrust Sidis back into the spotlight and, in the
process, set off the fury of a man who thought he had the power to fight back.
Immediately after the article came out, Sidis hired a Boston attorney, William
Aronoff, who contacted The New Yorker and warned them that Sidis was going to
press a libel claim.133 A meeting was arranged between Aronoff and The New
Yorker’s counsel.134 The magazine’s lawyers asked Aronoff to show how the
article was false, and he would not. Aronoff left the office with threats of suit.135
Around the same time Sidis also initiated a libel suit against the newspaper The
Boston American, which published a piece in late 1938 based on the New Yorker
article.136
Later that year Sidis hired a small New York firm called Green and Russell, and
Thomas Green met with lawyers for The New Yorker in the summer of 1938.137
Green insisted that The New Yorker had “done a great injustice to Sidis; that it had
deliberately and maliciously intruded on Sidis’s right to privacy and had dragged
him, against his will, into the cruel glare of publicity.”138 Shortly afterwards, Sidis
filed suit against The New Yorker for $150,000, on two counts of invasion of
privacy and one count of libel.139 He argued that the article had defamed him, and
also that The New Yorker violated a New York state privacy statute by using his

131. Id.
132. THURBER, supra note 116, at 212. Morris Ernst wrote coyly in his autobiography that it was a
“tender, sympathetic piece.” MORRIS L. ERNST, SO FAR SO GOOD 53 (1948).
133. Letter from The New Yorker to Barbara Linscott (Jan. 24, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker
Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Sept. 14, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, N.Y. Pub. Library).
According to Sidis’ biographer, the Boston Sunday Advertiser in the same year published an article titled
Sidis, Genius, Discovered Working as a Boston Clerk, and subtitled Child Prodigy of 1914 Shuns
Publicity. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 225–28. It began: “Genius in a tawdry South End boarding
house. Genius driven by some strange mental quirk to seek obscurity in dullness and mediocrity. . . .
[Y]esterday the Sunday Advertiser writer found him in a small room, wall-papered and dark, where for
the past five years he has lived unknown, unsung, uncaring.” Id. The article went on to describe his odd
habits, his dull work and his utter rejection of his talents, and it suggested that Sidis suffered from some
form of insanity. Id. William sued the Advertiser for libel, claiming that he had been “held up to
ridicule, and had suffered great anguish of mind, and [that] his reputation had been seriously injured.”
Id.
137. See Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Aug. 17, 1938) [hereinafter Letter from Alexander Lindey to Ik Shuman (Aug. 17,
1938)] (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
138. Id.
139. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 2–3, Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)
(No. 400).
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name and image for commercial uses, for the purpose of “trade.”140 His principal
claim was that the article violated the right of privacy in five states where a
common law right of privacy had been recognized and the magazine was
circulated.141
The libel claim was not surprising, particularly in the 1930s, an era that saw an
increasing number of libel suits against the popular press.142 The common law
privacy claim, however, was almost entirely unprecedented. Since the origin of the
privacy tort in the 1890 Warren and Brandeis Harvard Law Review article The
Right to Privacy, no major media outlet had been sued for publishing private facts
as an invasion of privacy.143 With only one known exception, no case had asked a
court to rule on the Warren and Brandeis argument that publishing embarrassing
information about a person’s private life should be actionable as a tort.144 In legal
and publishing circles, the case of Sidis v. F.R. Publishing was predicted, rightly, to
become a turning point in the history of the American law of privacy.
II. THE SIDIS CASE
The privacy tort had been developed precisely for situations like the one that
confronted William James Sidis. The tort action for invasion of privacy by
publication of embarrassing private facts had originated from a set of circumstances
not entirely unlike the one that confronted the hapless former boy genius. In 1890,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published the famous Harvard Law Review
article, The Right to Privacy, generally considered the starting point of the legal
history of privacy in the United States.145 Samuel Warren was a wealthy and
prominent Boston lawyer, and Brandeis was Warren’s former law partner.146
Warren was incensed by finding details of the Warren family’s home life and social
affairs spread on the society pages of several newspapers.147 More generally, the
authors were outraged by what was then the new trend of gossip columns and
“human interest” journalism in newspapers, and what they considered to be the
unwarranted and tasteless depiction of private life in the press.148
“The press,” Warren and Brandeis had written,

140. Id. at 2–3, 15.
141. Id. at 3; see also Letter from Alexander Lindey to Ik Shuman (Aug. 17, 1938), supra note
137.
142. NORMAN ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF LIBEL 212–21 (1986).
143. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
144. See Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. 1929) (holding that publication of a
photograph in connection with language attributed to the plaintiff was not an invasion of her right of
privacy even though she was incorrectly quoted).
145. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
146. See DONALD R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 22 (1973).
147. See id. at 23; see also Amy Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s
Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage That Led to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 35, 55–58 (2008).
148. See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 27 (1979).
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is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To
occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.149

“Persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concerns,” they
lamented, were “being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity.”150
Calling for a legal “right to privacy,” Warren and Brandeis proposed a cause of
action that would allow the victims of unwanted media publicity of private facts to
sue in tort and recover damages for emotional and dignitary injuries.151 An
invasion of privacy was different from defamation—the law of libel dealt only with
falsehoods, and it remedied only insults to reputation, not to one’s feelings. They
described the right to privacy not as a proprietary right but as a dignitary or
spiritual interest rooted in “an inviolate personality.”152
At a time of widespread public criticism of the abuses of scandalous “yellow
journalism,” the “right to privacy” was part of a broader effort by social elites to
crack down on the popular media.153 At the turn of the century, there were
campaigns for stricter defamation laws, and several states passed statutes that
imposed criminal punishment for publishing news of “bloodshed, lust and
crime.”154 The idea of a right to privacy that would saddle the press with civil
liability for invading the right of the individual to be let alone—to “pass through
this world . . . without having his picture published . . . or his eccentricities
commented upon either in handbills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals, or
newspapers”—was received with great public enthusiasm. 155
But the privacy tort did not develop as Warren and Brandeis had envisioned. In
the early twentieth century, several cases were brought over the unauthorized use of
personal portraits and photographs in ads, on the theory that such uses were an
invasion of privacy, but very few lawsuits were brought by the victims of
embarrassing newspaper publicity, which had been Warren and Brandeis’ original
concern.156 One explanation is that the highly public nature of a lawsuit threatened
to inflict on the plaintiff a punishment greater than the harm it sought to redress.
As one legal commentator wrote, “when exposed to public view, [most] simply
wriggle away and hope to be forgotten. Before they will bring suit the disturbance

149. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 196.
150. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 214.
151. Id. at 213–15; see also Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality,
and History, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 553, 553–54 (1960).
152. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 205.
153. Mitchell Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy, 67 AM. MERCURY 397, 399 (1948)
[hereinafter Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy].
154. ROSENBERG, supra note 142, at 214. The “bloodshed, lust and crime” statutes are
summarized in Winters v. New York. See 333 U.S. 507, 520–23 & n.2 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
155. Elbridge L. Adams, The Law of Privacy, 175 N. AM. REV. 361, 361 (1902).
156. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 196.
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must be so terrific that going to court can’t make it worse.”157
This raises the question: Given the publicity that a lawsuit was likely to
generate, why did Sidis sue The New Yorker? The only answer is that to a man
who had for years been wronged by the press, who hated the press, who blamed it
for a bitter, stunted childhood, the possibility of vindicating himself in a court of
law was worth the publicity he so despised. By his own admission, Sidis wanted to
punish The New Yorker by forcing it to undertake the burden of a lawsuit and to
potentially pay out steep damages. According to his lawyer Thomas Greene, Sidis
“wished not only to even the score with The New Yorker but to make an example of
it, so there would be no further inroads on his private life.”158 Sidis was “prepared
to carry the case to the Supreme Court” if necessary.159 Sidis wanted to
demonstrate to the world, in the public forum of a federal courtroom, that the
magazine had wronged him, and to have his hurt and outrage validated with the
authority of the law.160 Another reason, to put it bluntly, was likely money. Sidis
made minimal wages as an adding machine clerk and was reportedly in debt. He
may have seen the lawsuit as a meal ticket—a chance to potentially quit his
mundane job and to devote himself full-time to his writing and various hobbies.
The New Yorker relied on Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, a prestigious, small New
York law firm which had become known for handling “famous literary and free
expression cases.”161 The firm had been The New Yorker’s in-house counsel since
1932.162 Most of its work involved protecting the magazine against libel claims.163
In response to threatened libel suits, the firm instituted a libel protection process for
the magazine’s authors and editors to follow.164 Writers “were to provide editors
with a memorandum giving the sources of their information and relevant dates,”
and the magazine established a highly organized and professional fact-checking
department.165 This did not eliminate libel claims, however. In addition,
Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst developed a standard procedure—to notify the
complainant that the magazine had not in fact libeled him, and to refuse to publish
a retraction.166 The lawyers refused to settle, fearing that a reputation for easy
settlement would invite all those who had been mocked or criticized by the
magazine to bring libel claims.167 It was a point of pride at The New Yorker that it
had never once paid out cash to settle a libel suit.168 In virtually every case, the
lawyers had been able to use “explanation or persuasion” to convince complainants
157. Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy, supra note 153, at 404.
158. Letter from Alexander Lindey to Ik Shuman (Aug. 17, 1938), supra note 137.
159. Id.
160. Randall Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs
Get, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 790–91 (1986) (naming the major motivating factors behind pursuing libel
lawsuits as “restoring reputation, correcting what plaintiffs view as falsity, and vengeance”).
161. FORDE, supra note 107, at 88.
162. Id. at 89.
163. Id. at 88.
164. Id. at 93.
165. Id. at 94.
166. Id.at 93–94.
167. Id. at 94–95.
168. Id.
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to back down and abandon their claims.169
Alexander Lindey was assigned the Sidis case.170 Both Lindey and founding
partner Morris Ernst were highly-regarded entertainment and literary lawyers who
had been employed by some of the most noted literary figures of the day, including
James Joyce and playwright Edna Ferber.171 They were also famous for their work
on high-profile cases involving free speech and civil liberties. Ernst and Lindey
were known for their defense of James Joyce in the Ulysses obscenity trial in
1933.172 In a series of landmark cases in the early 1930s, they successfully
represented defendants convicted of obscenity for the circulation of birth control
information.173 In the 1940s, Lindey defended Esquire magazine in an important
free press case that reached the Supreme Court.174 Ernst was counsel for the
American Civil Liberties Union, and Lindey had been counsel for the American
Newspaper Guild.175 As coauthors, they published a treatise against film and
literary censorship titled The Censor Marches On and a book on libel law called
Hold Your Tongue: Adventures in Libel and Slander.176
From the start, Lindey knew that the battle with this eccentric, litigious and
emotionally unstable plaintiff would be difficult and one of a kind. In early 1938,
Sidis contacted The New Yorker reporter Barbara Linscott and allegedly threatened
to do “dire things” to her unless she cooperated with him for the purpose of
building up a case.177 Lindey then dispatched an attorney to Boston to get Sidis to
drop the suit in exchange for an “apology and small token payment for expenses
incurred.”178 Sidis rejected the offer and responded in a way that was described as
“downright screwy.”179 He submitted to the lawyer a “written memorandum . . .
with a long series of ‘fines’ to be paid” by the magazine if they mentioned his name
again.180 In early 1938, Lindey asked The New Yorker’s fact checking department
to check the accuracy of every statement in the article and obtained Linscott’s
notes.181 Recognizing that the “litigation may well turn out to be a serious one,”
169. Id. at 95.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 88.
172. See United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
173. See United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 567 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. One Book
Entitled “Contraception,” 51 F.2d 525, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
174. See Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
175. PAUL BOYER, PURITY IN PRINT: BOOK CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA FROM THE GILDED AGE TO
THE COMPUTER AGE 203 (2d ed. 2002); Alexander Lindey, 85, Lawyer and an Author of Textbooks,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1981, at D23.
176. See MORRIS LEOPOLD ERNST & ALEXANDER LINDEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON: RECENT
MILESTONES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OBSCENITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1940).
177. Letter from The New Yorker to Barbara Linscott, supra note 133.
178. Letter from Ik Shuman, Editor, The New Yorker, to Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum,
Wolff & Ernst (Oct. 4, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
179. Letter from Ik Shuman, Editor, The New Yorker, to Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum,
Wolff & Ernst (Oct. 17 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
180. Id.
181. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
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Lindey wrote his colleagues, it was extremely important that the case be “fully
prepared.”182
In 1938, Lindey filed a motion to dismiss the privacy claims.183 Lindey did not
file a motion to dismiss the libel complaint, stating that his answer to the libel claim
would depend on the disposition of the privacy issue.184 Lindey probably hoped to
defeat the suit on the privacy grounds, as Sidis’s privacy claims were far weaker
than his libel claim. Though the piece had been fact-checked, its literary style, with
its colorful language and innuendo, made it possible to pull from it potentially
defamatory meaning. In the motion to dismiss the common law privacy claim,
Lindey invoked the privilege for publications dealing with matters of public
interest.185 In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis had proposed a privilege
for publications dealing with “matter[s] of public or general interest,” and the
“public interest” privilege had been recognized in a handful of privacy cases since
1890.186 Sidis’s life was a “matter of public interest,” Lindey argued—the public
had a “rightful interest” in him—and thus the article was exempt from liability for
invasion of privacy.187
When Sidis brought his case, at least fifteen states recognized some version of
the privacy tort.188 Many of the cases in which a right to privacy had been
recognized involved the use of names and images in commercial advertising, not
the publication of embarrassing private facts.189 There was virtually no law to guide
Sidis and The New Yorker’s lawyers as they made their respective claims.
A. SIDIS IN DISTRICT COURT
The New Yorker’s lawyers argued their motion to dismiss before Judge Henry
Goddard in the District Court of the Southern District of New York.190 Given the
dearth of case law on the tort of invasion of privacy by publication of private facts,

The New Yorker (Aug. 9, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
182. Id.
183. See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
184. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Harold W. Ross,
Editor, The New Yorker (Aug. 9, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and
Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
185. See generally Sidis, 34 F. Supp. 19 (distinguishing this case from others on the basis of the
public interest).
186. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 214; see, e.g., Jones v. Herald Post, 18 S.W.2d 972, 973
(Ky. 1929); Hillman v. Star Publ’g Co., 117 P. 594, 596 (Wash. 1911).
187. See generally Sidis, 34 F. Supp. 19; see also Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 12, Sidis v. F-R
Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (No. 400).
188. See Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century’s Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV.
526, 529–30 (1940).
189. Id.; see also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Kunz v. Allen,
172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918); Foster-Millburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909), appeal after
remand, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1910); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1080–81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911);
Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
190. Sidis, 34 F. Supp. 19.
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the judge was “deeply interested in the case,” Lindey observed.191 Recognizing the
significance of the issues involved, Goddard “kept the [case] under advisement for
over two months” and wrote a lengthy twenty-one page opinion.192
Goddard was sympathetic to Sidis’s plight.193 Yet he concluded that Sidis had
not stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy.194 In his brief, Sidis had cited a
series of cases that had recognized a common law right to privacy in Georgia,
Kansas, Kentucky and Missouri.195 Most of them involved advertising uses.196
Goddard concluded that none of them supported Sidis’s contention that “‘the right
of privacy’ [could] be violated by a newspaper or magazine publishing a correct
account of one’s life or doings.”197
The only case in Sidis’s brief that involved the publication of private facts was
Brents v. Morgan, a 1927 Kentucky case.198 Brents involved a garage owner who
“placed a large sign in [his] front window . . . informing the public that the plaintiff
had . . . promised to pay his bill but had not done so and that he would continue to
advertise it until it was paid.”199 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky had allowed a
cause of action for invasion of privacy on the grounds that the publicized material
was not a matter of public interest.200 Goddard distinguished Brents from Sidis,
suggesting that while an unpaid debt was not a matter of legitimate public interest,
Sidis’s story was.201 Goddard did not say how he reached this conclusion.
On the New York privacy claim, Goddard held that the statute had not been
violated because the New Yorker story was not for the purpose of “trade.”202 The
New York privacy statute required a court to determine whether the publication of
a person’s image, name or identity was for a commercial or “trade” use.203 If the
publication was not explicitly marked as advertising, it was considered not to be
“trade,” but rather news.204 New York case law had long held that articles in
newspapers and magazines would not be considered “trade” despite the fact that the
publications were for profit.205
Sidis had relied on the 1913 New York case Binns v. Vitagraph, involving the
fictional presentation in a movie newsreel of the story of a radio operator, Binns,
191. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Oct. 7, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
192. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Dec. 22, 1938) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives
Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
193. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 235.
194. See Sidis, 34 F. Supp. at 25.
195. See id. at 21–22 (distinguishing these cases).
196. See id.
197. Id. at 21.
198. Id.; see Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927).
199. Sidis, 34 F. Supp. at 21.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 21, 25.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id. at 24; see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1903).
204. Sidis, 34 F. Supp. at 24.
205. See, e.g., Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publ’g Co., 146 N.Y.S. 999, 1000–01 (App. Div. 1914).
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who had been involved in a noted shipwreck.206 The radio operator sued, and the
court held that the use of his name and image was a prohibited commercial use.207
Sidis argued that The New Yorker sought to profit from his identity in the same way
that the newsreel company had exploited Binns.208 Binns was inapplicable,
Goddard said.209 The appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity in Binns was
forbidden because the newsreel was fictionalized and therefore not “news.”210 If a
newspaper had published a truthful account of the shipwreck, no statutory violation
would have occurred.211 Goddard likened this hypothetical news publication to the
New Yorker story, noting that both were matters of great “current interest.”212
The opinion raised more questions than it answered. Goddard did not explain
what he meant by a “matter of public interest.” He did not indicate why he thought
the New Yorker story was material of great “current interest,” or how the “public’s
interest” could be determined. The lower court’s decision in Sidis v. F.R.
Publishing did nothing to clarify the muddled doctrine on the tort of invasion of
privacy by publication of private facts.
B. SIDIS AT THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Undaunted, Sidis promptly appealed to the New York-based Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. He changed attorneys and was next represented by a small firm,
Sapinsky, Lukas & Santangelo.213 Lindey again tried to get Sidis to settle but
insisted that “any money settlement was out of the question.”214 He proposed that
Sidis write a letter presenting his views that would be printed in the magazine’s
corrections section, or that Sidis write an article for The New Yorker on “the
collection of streetcar transfers” or “possibly on the subject of the vulnerability of
the right of privacy of the individual in modern society.”215 Sidis again refused.
Claiming that his $17 weekly salary as an adding machine clerk made the filing
fees prohibitive, Sidis filed a motion to file his papers with the court in forma
pauperis.216 Edwin Lukas argued the case before the Second Circuit for Sidis, and
The New Yorker was represented by Lindey, no stranger to that court.217
206. Sidis, 34 F. Supp at 24; see Binns v. Vitagraph, 103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913).
207. Binns, 103 N.E. at 1111.
208. Sidis, 34 F. Supp at 24.
209. Id. at 25.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Nov. 30, 1939) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, N.Y. Pub. Library).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Apr. 6, 1940) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library). Lindey noted that the panel of judges “expressed considerable interest in the case.”
Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor, The New
Yorker (Apr. 29, 1940) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y.
Pub. Library).
217. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir. 1940).
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The three-judge panel that heard the case consisted of Robert Patterson, Thomas
Walter Swan and Charles Edward Clark.218 Swan and Clark were former deans of
the Yale Law School.219 Clark, who wrote the Sidis opinion,220 had been recently
appointed by Franklin Roosevelt, and is widely recognized as being the principal
author of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.221 Prior to taking up work in
procedure, as a Yale law professor, Clark had written on constitutional issues and
had an interest in freedom of speech.222
The Sidis case was heard in July 1940.223 Clark acknowledged that the case
raised an important and novel question of law.224 It was one of the first to bring
forward and test the very premise of the hallowed Warren and Brandeis argument
that publishing “intimate, revealing or harmful” truths about an individual could be
actionable as a tort.225 This was a daunting task, in light of the fact that “none of
the cited rulings goes so far as to prevent a newspaper or magazine from publishing
the truth about a person, however intimate, revealing, or harmful the truth may
be.”226 The court “face[d] the unenviable duty of determining the law of five states
on a broad and vital public issue which the courts of those states have not even
discussed.”227
As in the lower court, there was sympathy for Sidis.228 At oral argument,
Alexander Lindey maintained that the publication of the story was “fully justified
because Sidis’s later life was a tragic illustration of the havoc caused by the
ruthless parental exploitation of gifted children; and that the public had a legitimate
interest in learning the facts about him.”229 According to Lindey, Judge Patterson
brushed aside this argument “rather angrily” and “said that . . . the article was cruel
and unjustified.”230 Judge Clark observed that the article was a “ruthless exposure”
and “merciless in its dissection of intimate details of its subject’s personal life . . .
and the pitiable lengths to which he has gone in order to avoid public scrutiny.”231
The panel nonetheless affirmed the district court, holding that the claim under the
New York privacy statute failed because the publication was “news” rather than
“trade,” and that Sidis had not stated a cause of action under the common law right
218. Id.
219. Fred Rodell, For Charles E. Clark: A Brief and Belated but Fond Farewell, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 1323, 1324 (1965); Eugene V. Rostow, Thomas W. Swan, 1877–1975, 85 YALE L.J. 159, 160
(1975).
220. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 806.
221. Michael E. Smith, Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J.
914, 915 (1976).
222. See infra at notes 346–47 and accompanying text.
223. Sidis, 113 F. 2d. 806.
224. Id. at 808.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 235.
229. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Harold Ross, Editor,
The New Yorker (July 24, 1940) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
230. Id.
231. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
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to privacy because he was a public figure and the story was a “matter of public
interest.”232
1. Public Figures
Warren and Brandeis in The Right to Privacy had envisioned a privilege for the
publication of information about public figures’ private lives.233 Limited public
disclosures of the personal habits and activities of public figures would not be
actionable as an invasion of privacy on the theory that public figures, such as
politicians and public officials, had willingly put themselves before the public eye
and thus “waived” part of their right “to live their lives screened from public
observation.”234 A degree of public scrutiny was the tradeoff for the honor,
recognition and power that came with a prominent public position. But the public
figure’s waiver of privacy did not warrant unlimited forays into his personal life.
According to Warren and Brandeis, only information directly related to his public
activities—information “necessary to determine whether it is wise and proper and
expedient to accord to him the approval or patronage which he seeks”—was fair
game for public consumption.235 A politician’s romantic affairs, or the details of
his home and family life would be off-limits to the public, as they did not shed light
on his public role. In contrast to the modern era, when virtually all private conduct
would be regarded as bearing on one’s public deeds, there was perceived to be a
distinction between “the public side of . . . a public man” and “his whole
personality.”236
While the public figure waiver had been discussed and theorized by legal
commentators, in 1940 its practical application was unclear.237 When Sidis brought
his lawsuit, there were very few recorded court cases involving public figures who
sued over the publication of private facts.238 In these cases, no court was asked to
confront the issue of exactly how much of his privacy the public figure waived.239
A few courts in the 1930s had suggested that if presented with the question, they
would construe the waiver more broadly than Warren and Brandeis had.240 They
suggested that given the media’s preoccupation with public figures’ personalities
and private lives, public figures assumed the risk of having relatively intimate
personal information disclosed in the press when they embarked on a public
232. Id. at 809–10.
233. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 215.
234. Id.
235. See id.; Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68, 72 (Ga. 1905).
236. Right of Privacy, 12 VA. L. REG. 91, 97 (1906).
237. See, e.g., Earl Handler, The Right of Privacy and Some of Its Recent Developments, 44 DICK.
L. REV. 39, 40 (1939); Nizer, supra note 188, at 541; John Gilmer Speed, The Right of Privacy, 163 N.
AM. REV. 64, 73–74 (1896).
238. Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 435 (D. Mass. 1893); Jeffries v. N.Y. Evening Journal
Publ’g Co., 124 N.Y.S. 780, 780 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
239. Corliss, 57 F. at 435; Jeffries, 124 N.Y.S. at 780.
240. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 n.1 (W.D. Okla.
1938), rev’d, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Martin v. New Metro. Fiction, Inc., 237 A.D. 863 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1932); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338, 340, 341 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1938).
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career.241 As an Ohio appeals court had noted in 1938, “[the right of privacy] does
not exist where the person has become prominent, notorious, or well known so that
by his very vocation or conduct he has dedicated his life to some continued contact
with the public and thereby has waived his right of privacy.”242 But comments like
these were only hints—mere dicta—and at the time of the Sidis case the scope of
the public figure’s waiver of privacy was very much an open question.
Courts did, however, expand the concept of the “public figure” far beyond what
Warren and Brandeis had intended. Reflecting nineteenth century understandings
of fame, the Warren and Brandeis definition of the public figure was normative—a
public figure was a person who had voluntarily taken up public affairs, such as a
government official or civic leader, and fame and publicity were returns for his
substantive contributions to public life.243 By the 1930s, however, courts had
begun to define the public figure in largely descriptive terms—a public figure was a
person who had been publicized. Thus not only figures like actors, “criminals,
prize fighters, [and] fan dancers,” were regarded as public figures, but so were
average citizens who happened to get their names or pictures in the press.244 In
Hillman v. Star Publishing, the daughter of a man arrested for real estate fraud sued
a newspaper for invasion of privacy when it published her picture in conjunction
with a story about the crime.245 A Washington appeals court, holding that no
invasion of privacy had occurred, suggested that the girl’s connection to the case,
albeit tangential and unwilling, made her a public figure.246 In 1929, in Jones v.
Herald Post, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a woman who witnessed her
husband attacked and killed on the street had no cause of action for invasion of
privacy against the local paper when it published a picture of her.247 The woman
became a public figure by becoming involved, though involuntarily, in a “matter of
public interest.”248
This “involuntary public figure” concept upended the earlier notion that fame
and publicity should reflect the individual’s intent to enter public life. It was an apt
reflection of the changing nature of fame in the twentieth century, which had
become increasingly divorced from achievement.249 In an age of human interest
journalism, when the true stories of everyday people had become a major
publishing genre, ordinary people could find themselves thrust before the media

241. Martin, 10 Ohio Op. at 341 (“Persons who expose themselves to public view for hire cannot
expect to have the same privacy as the meek, plodding stay-at-home citizen.”).
242. See id. at 340–41; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939) (the public
figure “must . . . pay the price of even unwelcome publicity through reports upon his private life and
photographic reproductions of himself and his family,” unless . . . defamatory).
243. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 215.
244. See Nizer, supra note 188, at 540 (discussing criminals, prize fighters and fan dancers).
245. See Hillman v. Star Publ’g Co., 117 P. 594 (Wash. 1911).
246. See id. at 596.
247. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. 1929).
248. Id.
249. LEO BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN: FAME AND ITS HISTORY 546 (1997); LARY MAY,
SCREENING OUT THE PAST: THE BIRTH OF MASS CULTURE AND THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
(1980).
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spotlight by doing nothing more than piquing public interest or curiosity.250 “If
fate brings [one] tragedy, pain, or even extraordinary luck, his private life will
surely be served up hot and steaming,” noted one critic of the 1940s.251 The papers
were filled with “human interest” stories about persons whose connection to
important matters was of the slightest.252
At the time Sidis brought his case, courts in privacy cases continued to inquire
whether a plaintiff had voluntarily put himself in the spotlight and “waived” his
right to privacy. Yet the waiver inquiry was beginning to fall out of favor as it
came to be recognized that fame was almost entirely a function of the public’s
interest or curiosity in a person and the mass media’s ability to generate or further
that interest. As a noted privacy lawyer aptly observed in 1940, “public curiosity”
had become “a mysterious thing”—one that “frequently concentrates most heavily
on those least deserving” of it.253 The subject’s desire to be famous or to enter the
public arena had relatively little to do with it.
This did not mean that a person put before the public against her will had to
remain there indefinitely. According to the Restatement (First) of Torts, a
influential legal treatise published by the American Law Institute in 1939,
involuntary public figures, whose rise to public attention was associated with a
specific event such as an accident or a crime, should have a right to return to
anonymity when the event with which they had been associated had passed, and
public interest in them had waned.254 Referring to those “unjustly charged with
crime or the subject of a striking catastrophe,” the Restatement observed that such
persons were “objects of legitimate public interest during a period of time after
their conduct or misfortune has brought them to the public attention.”255 But if
their stories were rehashed in the press after they “reverted to the lawful and
unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community,” they might have a cause of
action for invasion of privacy.256 In Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, a federal district court
in California recognized this principle when it rejected the motion to dismiss a
privacy claim brought against NBC for broadcasting the story of a robbery a year
and a half after it had occurred.257 When the victim of the holdup heard his story
retold on the radio, he was forced to relive the horrible event, causing
psychological trauma that led to his unemployment.258 It was implied in the court’s
opinion that reporting on the holdup at the time it occurred would not have been an
invasion of privacy, and that the victim, for a period of time after the incident, was
legitimately a public figure.259 But over time he lost his public figure status, and a
250. See Mitchell Dawson, Paul Pry and Privacy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1932, at 385–86
[hereinafter Dawson, Paul Pry and Privacy].
251. Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy, supra note 153, at 405.
252. Id.
253. Nizer, supra note 188, at 540.
254. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
258. Id. at 845–46.
259. Id. at 846–47.
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radio broadcast that dredged up the story from the past interfered with his right to
revert to anonymity and to be left alone.260
There were, however, public figures whose lives commanded deeper and more
long-term public interest. These “general interest” public figures became well
known not for their association with an isolated or random event, but rather for
their accomplishments, talents or interesting lives.261 General interest public
figures were often “voluntary,” in that they had willingly put themselves before the
spotlight, but they might also be involuntary. Their defining quality was that they
had generated sustained public interest or concern, and in so doing, secured a place
in the collective memory. In an early privacy case, Corliss v. Walker, a federal
district court implied that these sorts of public figures had no legal right to retreat
from the public gaze, even after death.262 In Corliss, the wife of a deceased
inventor claimed that the author of a biography of her late husband invaded his
privacy by describing incidents in his life without his consent.263 The court held
that the celebrated inventor’s life story was a matter of public interest—the
common property of the people, “given to the public” for all time—and that his
family had no right to complain when others told it.264
It was against this backdrop that Sidis and The New Yorker sparred over whether
the reclusive genius was legally a “public figure.” Sidis argued that he had been an
involuntary public figure, since he had never sought publicity as a child, and that he
could not have waived his right of privacy, for he was only a child when his public
life began.265 His fame had been tied to his childhood feats, he argued; with those
events long past, he had a right, in the words of the Restatement, to revert to the
anonymous and “unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community.”266 The
New Yorker’s lawyers mocked the notion that a public figure could ever “retire.”267
“Society has [an interest] in free discussion,” Lindey argued.268 “[I]t would be an
evil day for writers and publishers, and a worse one for the courts,” when a public
figure could “of his own volition withdraw from the public scene at any time” then
“sue for breach of his right to privacy [when] he is subsequently written up.”269
Judge Clark did not say whether he thought Sidis was an involuntary public
figure. He concluded, nonetheless, that Sidis was a general interest public figure
because there was great and enduring public interest in him, and as such, he had no

260. See id. at 846–47; see also Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. App. 1931).
261. This exact term was not actually used in privacy cases; I have adopted it from libel law,
which draws distinctions between “limited purpose” public figures—the equivalent of privacy law’s
“involuntary public figure”—and “general purpose” public figures. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
262. Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 435 (D. Mass. 1893).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 264.
266. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
267. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 14, Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)
(No. 400).
268. Id. at 12.
269. Id. at 12–14.
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right to retreat from the public eye.270 “William James Sidis was once a public
figure,” Clark wrote.271 “As a child prodigy, he excited both admiration and
curiosity. Of him great deeds were expected. In 1910, he was a person about
whom the newspapers might display a legitimate intellectual interest, in the sense
meant by Warren and Brandeis, as distinguished from a trivial and unseemly
curiosity.”272
“Since then,” Clark continued, “Sidis has cloaked himself in obscurity.”273 He
had gone to “pitiable lengths” to seclude himself and separate himself from his
painful past.274 He was nonetheless a public figure at the time of the New Yorker
article because “his subsequent history, containing as it did the answer to the
question of whether or not he had fulfilled his early promise,” was still a “matter of
public concern.”275
How did Clark determine that Sidis’s adult life was a “matter of public
concern,” or as he later phrased it, a “matter of public interest”? He did not take an
opinion poll. He did not stand on the street and ask passersby if they remembered
or cared about William James Sidis. Clark appeared to have concluded that Sidis’s
story was a “matter of public interest” for no reason other than the fact that it had
appeared in a popular magazine.
2. The Public’s Interest
Clark confirmed that it was “public concern” or “public interest,” that
determined whether or not one was a public figure and how long they were
obligated to stay in the spotlight. “Public interest” also determined how much of a
public figure’s private life could be revealed without legally invading his privacy.
In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis proposed a privilege for
publications dealing with “matters of public or general interest.”276 “Matters of
public interest” were topics that served the “public interest,” in the sense of the
public welfare or public good, and private facts published in this context were
theoretically exempt from liability for invasion of privacy.277 News about politics,
finance and civic affairs were quintessential matters of public interest.278 A matter
of public interest was not merely what the public was interested in.279 Gossip about
private lives published merely for amusement or to satisfy idle curiosities was
never a legitimate matter of public interest.280
Under the Warren and Brandeis analysis, the details divulged in the New Yorker

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 809.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 214–16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id.
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piece would not have been “matters of public interest,” Judge Clark observed.281
The article revealed “personal details . . . of the sort that Warren and Brandeis
believed ‘all men alike are entitled to keep from popular curiosity.’”282 But, Clark
implied, changes in society since the nineteenth century—a reference to the
proliferation of private subjects in the mass media—made the “strict” Warren and
Brandeis standard no longer applicable.283 Contemporary social practices and
mores permitted more of a “lift[ing] of the veil” around public figures than those
authors would have allowed.284 The boundaries between public and private had
shifted, and American culture in the 1930s had come to regard much that would
have been off-limits in the 1890s as legitimate matters of public attention.285
Clark was not willing to “afford . . . all of the intimate details of private life an
absolute immunity from the prying of the press,” or to encourage the press to
pander to a “trivial and unseemly curiosity.”286 He would, however, permit
“scrutiny of the ‘private’ life of any person who has achieved, or has had thrust on
him the questionable and indefinable status of a ‘public figure.’”287 The degree of
public scrutiny of a public figure’s private life permitted by the law was to be
determined by the “public’s interest.” Like Judge Goddard at the district court,
Clark offered only a hazy definition of what the “public interest” was and how it
would be measured.288
The only reported case before Sidis in which a media defendant had successfully
invoked the public interest privilege was Jones v. Herald Post.289 In that case, the
court suggested that news of a man’s assault and murder on the street was a
legitimate matter of public interest, and that the publication of a woman’s
photograph in conjunction with the crime was privileged.290 In Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, decided the year before Sidis, a California district court of
appeal suggested that news of a suicide was a legitimate matter of public interest
and that the husband of the victim did not have a cause of action for invasion of
privacy when the newspaper published a photograph of the woman’s death.291
Clark observed that the incidents in Jones and Metter were “matters of public
interest,” in the classic Warren and Brandeis sense.292 They were “news”—current

281. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
282. Id. at 809.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. A writer in 1932 in The Atlantic noted: “The pendulum has swung far since the hyperreticent days of our grandmothers. . . . [T]he majority [has] lost all desire for privacy, either for
themselves or for anyone else. They step eagerly into the range of every newspaper and movie camera,
and send in their names by the thousand to have them announced over the radio.” See Dawson, Paul
Pry and Privacy, supra note 250, at 387.
286. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1929).
290. Id. at 973.
291. Metter v. L.A. Exam’r, 95 P.2d 491, 496 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
292. See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 808 n. 4.
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events of great importance and significance to the community.293
William James Sidis had been news, too, when he was a child. At that time,
stories about his amazing accomplishments sparked a “legitimate intellectual
interest,” Clark wrote.294 But the story of Sidis’s adult life was not a current event.
It was not news. Like much of human interest journalism, it straddled the line
between news and entertainment. The details presented in the New Yorker article
were not quintessential “matters of public interest,” Clark admitted.295 But he was
not willing to put The New Yorker in with tabloids, scandal publications and pulp
magazines that pandered to “unseemly” curiosities.296 Instead, Clark created a new
category of privileged material, one in between matters of public interest that
appealed to a “legitimate intellectual interest” and those that played to a “trivial and
unseemly curiosity.”297 This was the category of “popular news interest.”298 The
New Yorker article had “popular news interest,” Clark wrote; it held “great reader
interest, for it is both amusing and instructive.”299 Stories about the “misfortunes
and frailties of neighbors and ‘public figures,’” he observed, were of “considerable
interest . . . to the rest of the population.”300
The details about Sidis’s life in the New Yorker article were thus a privileged
“matter of public interest,” according to Clark, because they interested—that is,
titillated and amused—the public. With this, Clark entirely subverted the original
meaning of the public interest privilege. The only basis for Clark’s conclusion that
the material interested the public was the fact that it appeared in the mainstream
press. Clark permitted The New Yorker to engage in what one law review writer at
the time criticized as a “bootstrap-lifting venture.”301 The New Yorker brought
Sidis into the spotlight, then pointed to the interest it had generated to argue that
Sidis was a public figure and that the details of his private life were a “matter of
public interest.”302 This impermissibly “elastic interpretation” of the public figure
and public interest privileges, critics argued, rendered them “almost
meaningless.”303
Clark used a similar “leave it to the press” approach when he concluded that the
article did not violate community mores. The idea that the privacy tort could be
used to punish socially transgressive publications, those that disregarded
conventional standards of morality, had been part of the Warren and Brandeis
analysis and implicit in subsequent privacy opinions.304 The Sidis court, for the
293. Id.
294. Id. at 809.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 807.
300. Id. at 809.
301. Recent Cases, Torts—Right of Privacy—Public Figure Test as Determinative of Right to
Recovery, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 382, 384 (1941) (internal quotation marks omitted).
302. Id.
303. Recent Decision, Torts: Right of Privacy of Former Child Prodigy, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 88
(1940).
304. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 196; see, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist.

(2) BARBAS_POST-FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

SIDIS AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN PRIVACY LAW

12/24/12 10:56 AM

49

first time, made this standard explicit. The privacy tort tracked community norms,
the court suggested, and material that was “so intimate and so unwarranted in the
view of the victim’s position” as to offend the “community’s notions of decency”
could be liable as an invasion of privacy even if it was a matter of public
concern.305 The Second Circuit did not indicate how a court should determine
standards of community decency but claimed that no such violation had occurred in
the Sidis case. Perhaps, the fact that the material appeared in a popular and
reputable publication suggested that it was not offensive; the mainstream press was
not likely to publish information that would shock, insult or alienate its paying
readership. In looking to media content as the barometer of public morals and
public interests,306 the Sidis court gave the press substantial latitude to print private
facts without fear of liability for invasion of privacy.
3. Freedom of the Press and the Public’s Right to Know
Though Clark did not explicitly use the language of the Constitution, and The
New Yorker did not raise a formal First Amendment defense, Sidis must be viewed
as a free press case. The court’s approach to the case was informed by an emerging
civil libertarian theory and jurisprudence of freedom of speech and press, and new
ideas about why allowing The New Yorker to cater to the public’s interests and
curiosities was in the public’s best interest. In the 1930s, in the charged political
climate of the Great Depression, and with the rise of fascism in Europe, there were
heightened concerns with censorship, freedom of expression and belief and the free
flow of the news.307 Impediments to public access to information, and stateenforced standards of taste and morality of the sort that might be imposed by a
strict right to privacy, were coming to be viewed as anathema to the ideal of
participatory, pluralist democracy.308
At the turn of the century, the prevailing position in the legal academy and the
courts was that a tort action for invasion of privacy did not conflict with freedom of
speech and press.309 First Amendment law at that time was undeveloped and
largely deferential to the state; legislative prohibitions of speech that had a “bad
tendency,” speech that was said to offend public sensibilities or morals, were
generally considered legitimate exercises of the police powers.310 The entire entry
Ct. App. 1931); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W.2d 849, 849–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912).
305. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
306. See id.
307. See Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth
of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 77 (2000).
308. See BOYER, supra note 175, at 254–69.
309. See, e.g., W. Archibald McClean, The Right of Privacy, 15 GREEN BAG 494, 497 (1903)
(arguing that freedom of the press was guaranteed “except so far as it invades and violates the right of
privacy”). But see Comment, An Actionable Right of Privacy? Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
12 YALE L.J. 35, 37–38 (1902); S.D.M., Annotation, Injunctions Against Publications Intruding upon
Privacy: Corliss v. E W. Walker Co. United States Circuit Court, District of Massachusetts, 43 AM. L.
REG. 134, 135–36 (1895).
310. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 223–
24 (2008). The First Amendment was not yet incorporated through the Fourteenth, and the free speech
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on freedom of the press in a 1901 encyclopedia stated that it “consists in the right
to publish, with impunity, the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends,
whether it respects governments or individuals.”311 It did not protect publications
that “from their blasphemy, obscenity or scandalous character, may be a public
offense, or as by their falsehood and malice . . . may injuriously affect the standing,
reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.”312 Libels and the publication of
humiliating private facts were described as destructive of public morals and thus
could be repressed without constitutional difficulty. As the Virginia Law Register
noted in 1906, “the constitutional prohibition against passing a law abridging
freedom of speech or the press, was not intended to confer a license, without any
limitation, to override the rights of others,” including the right to be left alone.313
“The constitutional right to speak and print,” noted the Georgia Supreme Court in
1905, did not carry with it the right to publicize a person’s picture or private life
against his will, which represented a grievous affront to the subject’s dignity and
liberty.314
By the time Sidis brought his case, however, free speech law had been
substantially developed and liberalized, throwing this earlier position into doubt.
Beginning with Near v. Minnesota, in a series of 1930s cases involving criminal
punishment of the advocacy of socialists, communists, labor radicals and other
dissenters, the Supreme Court rejected the bad tendency rule and initiated the
practice of heightened scrutiny of state action abridging speech on politics and
public affairs.315 With the exception of material that posed a “clear and present
danger” of imminent violence, prohibitions or impairments of political speech on
the basis of disfavored content or viewpoints were presumptively
unconstitutional.316 Under this approach, expression could no longer be suppressed
because it was merely distasteful, controversial or unpopular. Because free
expression was the cornerstone of democracy—“the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every . . . form of freedom,” as the Court wrote in 1937—
freedom of speech occupied a “preferred freedom” position in the scheme of
constitutional liberties, and state actions restricting speech could not stand unless
justified by a compelling government interest beyond mere disagreement with the
views espoused.317
provisions in most state constitutions were written to reflect the “bad tendency” rule. See DAVID
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 132, 147 (1997).
311. FELDMAN, supra note 310, at 234 (quoting 18 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW 1125 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1901)).
312. Id.
313. Right of Privacy, supra note 236, at 92.
314. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79 (Ga. 1905).
315. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708–22 (1931). In 1941, the Court demarcated the area
of protected speech as “matters of public concern,” which it described as “all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
316. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364–65 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 366–69 (1931).
317. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). On the “preferred freedom” theory of the
Court in this era, see FELDMAN, supra note 310, at 371–72.
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The justification for this position was the ideal of participatory democracy. The
proper government response to dissenting or discordant thought was tolerance
rather than repression—political strife would be resolved with open public debate
and “more speech, not enforced silence,” wrote Louis Brandeis, who as a Justice on
the United States Supreme Court had become a noted champion of free speech,
notwithstanding his support for privacy.318 Public discussion was the “duty” of
every citizen in a democratic society, Brandeis had written in his famous
concurrence in Whitney v. California, and it was only through disagreement,
dialogue and debate that the public could arrive at collective solutions to the issues
and problems of the day.319
In this emerging view of free expression and democracy, a free press played a
crucial role. The Court interpreted freedom of the press not only as the right of the
press to publish free from most state-imposed restrictions on content, but the right
of the public to have access to a wide range of information about public affairs, the
basis of “public discussion.” The Court recognized the importance of the mass
media—radio, film, mass-market print publications—as conduits for the
dissemination of news to the mass public.320 In Near, which struck down a state
law prohibiting the publication of a “scandal sheet,” the Court noted the necessity
of the press—even tabloids and scandalous newspapers—as a means of generating
public discourse around politics and civic affairs.321 In Grosjean v. American
Press, in which the Court invalidated a Louisiana law that imposed a
discriminatory tax on high-circulation newspapers, Justice Sutherland observed the
significance of a free press in disseminating news and enabling the public to
“unite[] for [its] . . . common good” as “members of an organized society.”322 In
Associated Press v. United States, upholding the application of antitrust law to the
newspaper industry, Justice Black observed that that the First Amendment
protected the public’s interest in the “dissemination of news from as many . . .
sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is possible,” which was
essential to “the vitality of our democratic government.”323
During the following decade, the Court took up a series of cases involving the
expression of religious minorities and the censorship of entertainment media, in
which the Court articulated what has been described as an antipaternalism theory of
freedom of speech: the purpose of the constitutional guarantee was to encourage
the flourishing of diverse forms of thought, culture and expression free from state
interference.324 The First Amendment prohibited restrictions on speech and
publishing based on arbitrary and subjective moral standards. It acted as a shield
for “many types of life, character, opinion, and belief [to] develop unmolested and

318. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
320. See Near, 283 U.S. at 720.
321. See id.
322. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
323. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28, 29 (1945).
324. Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 579, 617 (2004).
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unobstructed,” the majority wrote in Cantwell v. Connecticut, one of many cases in
this period in which the Court protected the free expression rights of Jehovah’s
Witnesses.325 Antipaternalism and anticensorship principles were also behind
Supreme Court decisions in the 1940s in cases dealing with content-based
restrictions on popular culture and entertainment. As the Court observed in
Hannegan v. Esquire, reversing an order of the Postmaster General denying the
second-class mailing privilege to Esquire magazine, “[u]nder our system of
government there is an accommodation for the widest variety of tastes and
ideas . . . . [A] requirement that literature or art conform to some norm prescribed
by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system.”326 The purpose of the
First Amendment was to protect the right of the people to freely “pick and choose”
what culture and information to consume “from the multitude of competing
offerings,” as “what seems to one to be trash may have for others fleeting or even
enduring values.”327 In Winters v. New York, the Court invalidated the conviction
of a seller of pulp magazines under a New York statute criminalizing the
publication and sale of materials depicting “bloodshed, lust and crime.”328 “What
is one man’s amusement teaches another’s doctrine. Though we can see nothing of
any possible value to society in these magazines,” the Court concluded, “they are as
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.”329
At the time of the Second Circuit’s decision in Sidis in 1940, these principles
had yet to become a part of formal constitutional doctrine. They flourished,
however, in the popular discourse around freedom of speech. During the
Depression and into World War II, free speech issues were the focus of great public
interest and attention. The public watched with horror the book burnings and
destruction of a free press in fascist Europe, and the suppression of American labor
protesters and communists convinced many that state repression of dissent was not
foreign to this country.330 At a time when the censorship of “indecent” or
“immoral” literature and film in dozens of states and municipalities around the
country was in decline, grassroots anticensorship movements gained an extensive
popular following.331 In writings and protests, they presented censorship of art and
culture as no less a free speech issue than the repression of unpopular political
views.332 In the 1930s, Lindey and Ernst were involved in a national campaign to
have film censorship declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment; the
effort took as its guiding premise the notion that movies were the “people’s

325. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); see also Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio,
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
326. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 157–58 (1946).
327. Id. at 158.
328. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508 (1948).
329. Id. at 510.
330. See Reuel Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of
the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 77–78 (2000); BOYER, supra note 175, at 265–66.
331.
See, e.g., BOYER, supra note 175, at 244–49; 265–69 (discussing the decline of vice societies
and other censorship movements in the late 1920s and early 1930s and the rise of anticensorship
movements).
332. Id. at 265–69.
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entertainment,” and that censors interfered with the public’s constitutional right to
consume the culture, entertainment and information it wished, unfettered by the
state.333
More expansive views of freedom of speech were also expressed in common
law doctrines in this period. State courts offered interpretations of obscenity law
that permitted a wider range of expression. In the famed Ulysses case, litigated by
Ernst and Lindey, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in 1933 held that sensual literature is not obscene, and that the judgment as to
whether or not material is obscene should be determined according to its effects on
the reasonable adult, rather than the vulnerable child, and in light of contemporary
community standards.334 There was also new attention to defamation law’s threat
to a free press and public discussion.335 Several states liberalized libel law by
adopting a conditional privilege that would immunize publishers from liability for
good faith misstatements of fact about public officials and “matters of public
concern.”336 The public’s right to freely learn about and criticize its leaders, libel
law reformers had argued, was the basis of democratic government, protected by
the Constitution.337
The Supreme Court did not address the potential conflict between the right to
privacy and free speech, nor the relationship between the First Amendment and tort
liability. In the 1930s, a free speech analysis was nonetheless beginning to
influence the discussion around the “public interest” privilege to the privacy tort
and the similar “news” privilege under the New York privacy statute. Free speech
ideas began to appear in state court opinions in cases involving privacy and the
media in the late 1930s. In Sarat Lahiri v. New York Daily Mirror, a New York
trial court held that a photograph published in a newspaper in conjunction with a
feature article about rope tricks was nonactionable because the article was a
newsworthy matter “of public interest,” and that a right of privacy that would
curtail the publication of “news items and articles of general public interest,
educational and informative in character” implicated the rights of a “free press.”338
In 1939, in Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Company, a New York trial court held
that a construction of the state privacy statute that would impose liability for the
publication of nonfiction works about “persons and concerning things of current
interest” violated freedom of speech.339 In his opinion in the lower court’s decision
in Sidis, Judge Goddard had similarly suggested that “the right of free speech and
freedom of the press” required a decision in favor of The New Yorker.340
Citing Judge Goddard’s dictum, The New Yorker presented the Sidis case to the
333. Samantha Barbas, How the Movies Became Speech, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 665 (2012).
334. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 184–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
335. ROSENBERG, supra note 142, at 212–21.
336. Id.
337. FREDERICK SEATON SIEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS 332 (1934);
Recent Case, Libel and Slander: Privilege: Libel of Candidate for Public Office: Limits of Fair
Comment, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 695 (1929).
338. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
339. Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 170 Misc. 974, 978, 981–83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).
340. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)
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Second Circuit as a battle for free speech.341 A ruling for Sidis, Lindey argued,
would mark the “first time that the courts of this country have upheld the right of a
person to prevent the publication of the truth about his life and doings.”342 If
Sidis’s theory were upheld, it would have a chilling effect on the publication of
popular literature and journalism, and the “bulk of contemporary nonfiction
literature would have to go by the boards.”343 “Every time a publication printed the
name or picture of a living person without his written consent, it would be inviting
suit.”344 “Biographical sketches such as those featured by every magazine of
standing” and “discussions of prominent personalities” in the New York Times
would be written out of existence.345
The magazine’s argument appears to have been received favorably by Judge
Clark. Though Clark’s position on the First Amendment in 1940 is not known, one
can glean some insights into his views on freedom of speech and civil liberties
from his earlier and later writings on the topic. As a law professor at Yale in the
1920s, Clark had written articles in the Yale Law Journal criticizing Supreme Court
decisions that had upheld World War I era convictions for dissident writings under
the Espionage and Sedition Acts.346 The only hope for success of government by
and for the people, he had written, was that “beliefs [be] formed without
compulsion and as a result of arguments tested by their power to get themselves
‘accepted in the market’”347 Clark would later write noted dissents in cases
involving convictions for refusal to comply with the House Un-American Activities
Committee in the post-World War II Red Scare.348 He condemned attempts to
“enforce conformity of political thinking” and to penalize the diversity of thought
that makes “democracy grow and flourish.”349 One biographer described Clark as
“instinctive” in his “support of . . . free speech.”350
Though Clark did not use constitutional language in Sidis, and framed his
discussion in terms of the common law “public interest” privilege, the Sidis opinion
reflected the emerging view of the First Amendment as a guarantee of public access
to a broad range of information through the mass media. A right to privacy that
permitted public figures to throw a shield around their private lives and immunize
themselves from truthful comment on their “dress, speech, habits, and ordinary
aspects of personality” violated democratic commitments to political transparency
341. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 4–5, Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)
(No. 400).
342. Id. at 6.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. C.E.C., Freedom of Speech—A Note on Professor Corwin’s Article, 30 YALE L.J. 68, 69–79
(1920).
347. Id. at 70.
348. See, e.g., United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 463–66 (2d Cir.1950), aff’d, 343 U.S. 1
(1952); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Rodell, supra note 219, at
1328–30.
349. Josephson, 165 F.2d at 97.
350. THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 108 (Roger K. Newman ed.,
2009).
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and accountability, Clark suggested.351 A right to privacy that allowed courts,
rather than publishers and consumers, to control what appeared in the media, he
implied, violated First Amendment principles.352 Though the contents of The New
Yorker, Clark probably recognized, were not a true mirror of the “public’s
interests”—the mass media both reflect and create popular interests and tastes—he
may well have believed that The New Yorker’s editors, whose concerns with profit
forced them to stay in step with audience preferences, were better suited to assess
popular interests and tastes than federal judges. Presaging later Supreme Court
decisions, the Sidis opinion suggested that the right of the public to make choices
about what culture, media and knowledge to consume—no matter how trivial or
banal—was a matter at the heart of freedom of speech.353 While the New Yorker
article may have been thoughtless, even crass, it was not the role of the court to
enforce good taste. “Regrettably or not,” Clark wrote, “the misfortunes and
frailties of neighbors and ‘public figures’” were subjects of interest to the public,
“[a]nd when such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to
bar their expression in the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day.”354
“Everyone will agree that at some point the public interest in obtaining information
becomes dominant over the individual’s desire for privacy,” he explained.355
The Second Circuit panel may have feared that the right to privacy, as Sidis
construed it, was a “vehicle for the establishment of a judicial censorship of the
press.”356 It was also effectively a prohibition of gossip. The late 1930s and early
1940s saw academic and popular interest in the sociology of gossip, particularly
gossip in the mass media.357 The consumption of gossip columns and human
interest journalism was coming to be recast as not merely a frivolous or prurient
pastime but as a potentially valuable social ritual. In an academic work published
the same year as the Sidis decision, the sociologist Helen MacGill Hughes argued
that gossip columns and human interest journalism permitted the “sort of
intercourse that people formerly carried on at the crossroad stores or back
fences.”358 In an urban, fragmented mass society lacking organic social ties,
popular journalism created the “conditions of close communication”—the common
interests and shared frames of reference—that bound strangers together as a
public.359 As sociologist Bernard Berelson had discovered in studies of newspaper
readership, by giving people something in common to talk about, news and
entertainment journalism became the basis of social interaction and connection.360

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940)
Id.
See, e.g., Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 157–58 (1946).
Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
Id.
See Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).
See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 112.
Id.
See generally id.
Bernard Berelson, What Missing the Newspaper Means, reprinted in MASS
COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT: KEY TEXTS, 1919–1968 254–62 (John Durham
Peters & Peter Simonson eds., 2004).
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The news media created a “general . . . community of interest . . . sufficient to make
[public] discussion possible,” sociologist Robert Park wrote in 1941.361 Human
interest stories of the type that appeared in The New Yorker forged a public created
through participation in a shared discourse developed and circulated by mass
communications.362
Under this view, a right to privacy that hindered the publication of popular
journalism interfered with not only the people’s right to access information but
their ability to constitute themselves as a public. Gossip should not be justiciable,
argued a writer in the New York Law Journal, praising the Sidis decision; a
prohibition on “the comment and gossip that circulates about most of us,” whether
oral or in print, would not only be a “threat to freedom of thought and expression”
but a foolish and futile attempt to quash a benign social practice.363 The law could
not compel people to mind their own business, or to suppress their natural curiosity
about their “leaders, heroes, villains, and victims,” in the words of the 1939
Restatement of Torts.364 Judge Clark, with his defense of “community mores” and
public discussion of “the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and ‘public
figures,’” may well have agreed.365
To the Second Circuit panel, allowing The New Yorker to cater to what the
public was interested in was in the public’s best interest. A reflection of the
political culture of the time and a harbinger of free speech doctrines to come, the
Sidis opinion defended the right of the public to satisfy its curiosities by learning
about and unmasking its “leaders, heroes, villains, and victims.”366 The opinion
established that the scope of the right to privacy was to be determined through the
weighing of competing values—a judicial balancing of the individual’s interest in
controlling his public image against the public’s right to know—in which the
interests of the public would most often win. Though unfortunate, the loss of
Sidis’s privacy was a necessary price to paid, in the words of The New Yorker’s
lawyers, for the “circulation of [information] dealing with the world we live in,”
and for “the truth [to] be free.”367
4. Further Appeals and Settlement
The Second Circuit decision was a major defeat for Sidis. A testament to his
enduring wrath for The New Yorker, he refused to drop the case. After the
decision, Sidis’s lawyer, Edwin Lukas, wrote a scathing letter to the New York Law
Journal in which he attacked the court’s conclusion that “the personal right of
361. Robert E. Park, News and the Power of the Press, 47 AM. J. SOC. 1, 6 (1941).
362. HUGHES, supra note 112, at 12.
363. Nathan April, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1940 (on file with The New Yorker
Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library). “The comment and the gossip which
circulates about most of us . . . cannot in any free community be inhibited, either directly or indirectly,
by the threat of civil action.” Id.
364. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939).
365. See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940)
366. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c.
367. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 6, 12, Sidis, 113 F.2d 806 (No. 400).
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seclusion is held to be subservient to the ‘dominant right’ of the press, in the
‘public interest,’ to disseminate ‘information.’”368 “Apparently, by reason of the
Sidis case, once a person has attention thrust upon him . . . his later life, private and
deliberately secluded as it may be, for all time and for all purposes, can be
exploited and made the subject of ruthless comment, if the truth be told.”369
Lukas then met with Alexander Lindey and notified him that Sidis planned to
appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court.370 Morris Ernst and Alexander
Lindey prepared a brief, which reiterated the argument in the Second Circuit
brief.371 Although the points in the Supreme Court brief were largely the same as
in the Second Circuit brief, as Lindey explained to an associate in 1940, the
“argumentative atmosphere had to be toned down.”372 “We could not make the
problem too attractive or intriguing, because we would have then run the risk of the
Supreme Court entertaining the writ.”373 In 1940, the Court denied certiorari.374
After the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, Sidis announced that he planned
to pursue the original libel complaint and to file an amended privacy complaint.375
In the amended claim, Sidis’ lawyers forwarded a novel interpretation of the
privacy tort, suggesting that it covered not only true, embarrassing disclosures of
private facts but also untruthful disclosures; the New Yorker article, they claimed,
was mostly false.376 “The Boy Wonder is riding again,” Lindey complained to The
New Yorker editor Ik Shuman.377 “What Sidis and his lawyers are probably trying
to establish is a new cause of action grounded in the twilight region presently
existing between breach of the right of privacy and libel.”378 Sidis’s lawyers filed
the new complaint in federal district court in February 1943.379 Lindey
successfully argued that the original dismissal of the privacy counts was a final
judgment preventing him from amending the same counts, and in May 1943, the
court dismissed the amended complaint.380 Lindey again tried to persuade Sidis to

368. Edwin J. Lukas, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16, 1940 (on file with The New Yorker
Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
369. Id.
370. Letter from Ik Shuman, Editor, The New Yorker, to Harold W. Ross, Editor, The New Yorker
(not dated) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
Lindey was “hyped” on the privacy claim, Shuman noted, and “this [was] going to be an important
damn case if he [went] through with appeal.” Id.
371. See Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Dec. 2, 1940) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Sidis v. F.R. Publ’g Corp., 311 U.S. 711 (1940); WALLACE, supra note 2, at 236.
375. See Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Feb. 2, 1943) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (May 6, 1943) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
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drop the suit by offering him the chance to write several articles for The New
Yorker for pay, to be published under his real name or a pseudonym.381 The
suggestion, like the previous offers, was turned down.382
Sidis then found new counsel and filed another amended complaint for libel,
seeking $10,000 in damages.383 His new lawyer, Hobart S. Bird, argued that The
New Yorker had caused the public to believe that Sidis was, among things,
“reprehensible,” “[d]isloyal to his country,” “[a] criminal,” “[a] loathsome and
filthy person in his personal habits,” “having suffered a mental breakdown,” “being
a neurotic person and having a deranged mind,” and “[a]s one pretending
extraordinary intellectual attainments and being a genius, yet in fact a fool,
incapable of making a decent living and living in misery and poverty.”384 Sidis
was determined to take the libel case to trial. “Certainly any ordinary plaintiff
would have been discouraged long before this,” Lindey wrote to T.M. Brassel at
The New Yorker.385 “It seems, however, that neither four court defeats nor the
passage of time have served to dampen his ardor to press ahead.”386 Lindey asked
Bird what Sidis really wanted, and the response was unexpected. Gone was the
language of vindication, dignity and justice—what Sidis wanted was money, “and
$10,000 of it,” Lindey wrote.387
On March 24, 1944, the case was put on calendar for trial.388 On April 3 and 4
of 1944, William was called before Morris Ernst and deposed.389 In another
attempt to get Sidis to settle, Ernst offered Sidis $1000 for any article he wrote on
any subject and promised that he would not have to use his own name. Sidis again
declined.390 Afraid that a jury would find that Sidis had been libeled, The New
Yorker offered Sidis a settlement in the amount of $600, which he accepted.391 It
was the first time the magazine made a “straight-money settlement.”392
It’s not clear why Sidis finally agreed to The New Yorker’s deal. An award of a
mere $600 was a far cry from the substantial sums he had initially hoped to extract
from the magazine. By 1944, however, Sidis could take satisfaction in the great
cost and hassle The New Yorker had endured in the lengthy litigation. Sidis had not
only punished the magazine in this way, but had been vindicated in the process.
Many observers and commentators were on his side.393 Though the law was
N.Y. Pub. Library).
381. See Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to T.M. Brassel, The
New Yorker (Dec. 21, 1943) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 265.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 266.
389. Id.
390. Frances Velie & Caroline Menuez, Twilight of a Genius, CORONET, Feb. 1945, at 40, 43.
391. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 269.
392. FORDE, supra note 107, at 100.
393. See infra notes 416–18, 430–33, 438, 439 and accompanying text.
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formally not in his favor, the judges had been demonstrably sympathetic.394 As
Sidis wrote in an April 1944 letter to Julius Eichel, an acquaintance from his
socialist days, the settlement was “at last some sort of victory in my long fight
against the principle of personal publicity.”395 There was another reason for Sidis
to settle: he was quite ill, and he needed whatever money he could get. 396 The
ongoing lawsuit clearly had taken a serious toll on his emotional and physical
health.
The New Yorker considered itself victorious, regarding the small payout as
negligible.397 But Sidis felt that he had triumphed in the case. As Sidis’s
biographer concluded, it was a sweet victory for William, who “had been libeled
from birth.”398
III. THE PARADOX OF PRIVACY
Sidis v. F.R Publishing was not only a landmark legal case but also a public
event. Sidis’s legal battles were widely publicized in academic journals, legal
publications and the popular media. Despite public interest in the New Yorker
article and public support for the “right to know,” many believed that the reclusive
genius had been wronged.399 The New Yorker article and the Second Circuit
decision were criticized for having interfered with what was described as Sidis’s
right to self-reinvention and transformation and his right to be forgotten.400
The reaction to Sidis illustrates what I call the paradox of American privacy—
the contradictory attitudes towards privacy and media exposure that have been held
by the American public since the earliest days of mass communications. Since the
early twentieth century, the public has demonstrated great interest in reading about
the private lives of public figures and “involuntary public figures” in the mass
media.401 At the same time, it has loudly protested the media’s threats to
privacy.402 Despite our willingness to peer in on the private lives of others, we
394. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Harold Ross, Editor,
The New Yorker (July 24, 1940) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library) (noting that Judge Patterson brushed aside Lindey’s argument and said that the
article was “cruel and unjustified”); Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst,
to Harold Ross, Editor, The New Yorker (June 21, 1940) (noting that the court was “not too sympathetic”
towards The New Yorker).
395. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 270.
396. Id. at 271–72.
397. Id. at 269.
398. Id.
399. See infra 411, 419–21, 433 and accompanying text.
400. See Fred Bartenstein, Jr., Recent Cases, Right of Privacy—Protection Against the Publication
of Newsworthy Information [Federal], 2 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 133, 138 (1940–1941) (“[I]t seems
hardly reasonable, that a former famous child prodigy who had suffered a breakdown and had long since
gone into seclusion would be considered a ‘public figure’ . . . .”); see also infra 411, 419–21, 433 and
accompanying text.
401. See generally SILAS BENT, BALLYHOO: THE VOICE OF THE PRESS (1927).
402. See, e.g., David Lawrence, The Lost Right of Privacy, 38 AM. MERCURY 12, 13 (1936);
Robert L. Floyd, Privacy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1925, at 8; Thomas Woodlock, Thinking it Over, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 13, 1936, at 4.
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have vigorously defended a “right to privacy” and have regarded privacy as an
important personal interest and prerogative that should be protected by the law.403
We want our gossip and our privacy, too.
Sidis was not the first time that the outcome in a privacy case had generated
public criticism. In 1902, in one of the most famous privacy cases in history, a
young woman had sought legal action in New York state court to stop the
publication of her portrait on posters advertising Franklin Mills Flour, claiming it to
be an invasion of privacy.404 While the court in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box acknowledged that the publication was an assault to the woman’s dignity, the
court rejected her claim and refused to recognize a right to privacy, noting that to
do so would open the floodgates of litigation and inundate courts with petty
claims.405 Roberson was condemned by the public, and for weeks, the New York
Times ran letters from readers angered by the court’s decision.406 The outrage led
the New York legislature to pass the privacy statute we have seen in the following
year.407
The public reaction to Sidis, though not quite as vehement, had a similar tenor to
the outrage around Roberson: the law had failed to protect a vulnerable person—
one genuinely averse to publicity and deeply wounded by it—from being thrust
before the public eye in an embarrassing and undignified manner. This was not the
case of a Greta Garbo who pursued a career as a movie star yet claimed that she
wanted to be “let alone.”408 Neither William James Sidis nor Abigail Roberson had
assumed the risk of the publicity they received. The public appeared to embrace
the “waiver of privacy” doctrine that was coming to be discredited by the courts:
that those who had voluntarily put themselves in the public eye surrendered much
of their privacy, but that those who did not, average citizens who pursued ordinary
lives outside of the public gaze, generally retained the right to control if, when and
how they would be known to the public.409
While people mocked the hypocrisy of the Garbos of the world, popular opinion
seemed to be on the side of Sidis.410 Though many read the New Yorker article and
were amused by it, at the same time, a significant portion of the audience, in the
words of one commentator, “felt that they were, with the author, intruding
inexcusably on Sidis’s privacy.”411 The public sympathy for Sidis only increased
403. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
404. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 450 (N.Y. 1902).
405. Id. at 443.
406. The Roberson decision “excited as much amazement among lawyers and jurists as among
the . . . lay public,” editorialized the New York Times. The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
1902, at 8.
407. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1903).
408. See JOHN BAINBRIDGE, THE FAMOUS BIOGRAPHY LAVISHLY ILLUSTRATED: GARBO 1 (1975)
(quoting Greta Garbo: “I never said, ‘I want to be alone’ . . . I only said, ‘I want to be let alone.’ There
is all the difference.”).
409. See infra note 418 and accompanying text.
410. See infra notes 419–20 and accompanying text.
411. Notes and Comment, Limitations on the Right of Privacy of a Quondam Public Figure, 74
N.Y. L. REV. 423, 429 (1940); see also Former Child Prodigy Fails in Pushing Suit on Magazine, L. A.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1940, at 11.
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after his death, not long after his settlement with the magazine. In 1944, Sidis
worked at a series of clerical jobs.412 In the summer of that year, his landlady
found him collapsed in his room.413 He had suffered a massive brain hemorrhage.
Sidis was taken to the hospital and died a few days later.414 The newspapers and
magazines were filled with expressions of pity.415
The Sidis saga fed into a burgeoning body of criticism in the 1930s and ‘40s of
the mass media’s intrusions into private life. The popular media of the time were
filled with articles that attacked what one writer in The Atlantic Monthly in 1937
described as “the current doctrine that the greatest good of the greatest number
requires the immolation of a daily quota of private lives on the altar of
publicity.”416 With the proliferation of “personality journalism,” “the art of
minding other people’s business,” a writer lamented in 1932, “has developed into a
major industry.”417 While a person may have had privacy in the confines of his
home, in public his activities became “fair game for any snooper who thinks him
‘newsworthy,’” complained the author of a piece in the popular magazine The
American Mercury.418 Yet those very same publications, of course, with their
focus on personalities and private lives, were responsible for the privacy problem
they so vehemently condemned.
Many were less upset by the initial publicity given to Sidis during his childhood
years than by The New Yorker’s attempt to revive interest in him. The magazine
had, in the eyes of many, interfered with society’s established customs and
practices for putting people on and taking them off the public stage. As one writer
noted in 1941, criticizing the decision, “in our modern civilization, many persons,
such as criminals, stage and screen stars, and others who were in the public eye in
past years are entirely forgotten today.”419 The public’s interest was transient and
fickle, as evidenced by the often meteoric rise and fall of movie stars. As a
historian of fame aptly observed many years later, “public acceptance was not a
threshold that once crossed meant you were always inside. It was more like a
revolving door.”420 By thrusting Sidis back into the limelight, The New Yorker had
meddled with what was described as the natural social process of forgetting.
The New Yorker article and the Second Circuit decision were also criticized for
412. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 272.
413. Id. at 272–73.
414. Id. at 273–74.
415. See, e.g., Prodigy’s Progress, WASH. POST, July 23, 1944, at B4 (“[B]right candle that he
was, young Sidis was quickly burned out.”); Sidis, a ‘Wonder’ in Boyhood, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1944, at 21 (“The one-time ‘boy wonder’ was found seriously ill and in a coma Thursday night in his
room in a Brookline boarding house, apparently destitute.”); Sidis, Noted Prodigy as a Child, Dies in
Boston, Obscure, HARTFORD COURANT, July 18, 1944; The Hidden Genius, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1944,
at 18 (“[H]e was shy, distrustful, adverse to companionship.”).
416. See, e.g., Dawson, Paul Pry and Privacy, supra note 250, at 385; Meyer Berger, Surrender of
Privacy, SCRIBNER’S MAG., Apr. 1939, at 16.
417. Dawson, Paul Pry and Privacy, supra note 250, at 385.
418. Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy, supra note 153, at 397.
419. Torts—Right of Privacy—Matters of General or Public Interest, 39 MICH. L. REV. 501, 503
(1941).
420. BRAUDY, supra note 249, at 546.
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having interfered with what was described as Sidis’s right to reinvent himself.
Befitting a nation with substantial opportunities for social and geographic mobility,
the American Dream had historically been described as one of second chances—of
the prospect of remaking one’s public image and starting one’s life anew.421 By the
1930s, it was still possible to move to Texas, change one’s name and appearance,
and begin an entirely new existence, unencumbered by one’s past.422 Yet as critics
in the interwar period began to observe, popular journalism, which had discovered
new ways to fill pages by rehashing old news, was creating a world where perhaps
nothing could be forgotten. As the popular legal commentator Mitchell Dawson
observed in The American Mercury in 1948, Sidis marked the law’s acceptance of
this disturbing trend.423 After Sidis, those whose “love affairs, marital troubles, and
adventures in court or jail [were] rehashed in the Sunday magazines” could do
nothing about it under the law.424 The moral of the Sidis case, he lamented, was
that “once news, always news.”425
The law reviews and legal journals were highly critical of the decision. All
recognized the significance of the Sidis case as a milestone in the history of privacy
law. Sidis was one of the first clear judicial statements on the viability of the
Warren and Brandeis “right to privacy” as applied to mass media publications. It
was the first authoritative ruling on what were “matters of general or public
interest” and “how far into [the public figure’s] life does th[e public’s interest]
rightly extend.”426 After the Second Circuit decision, Lindey observed that there
was a “tremendous interest in the case on the part of the legal profession” and that
he had received “a number of requests for copies of the briefs from lawyers.”427 In
1940, the case was the subject of the moot court at Yale Law School.428
Almost all of the law review writers believed that Sidis was wrongly decided.
The New Yorker executive editor Ik Shuman mocked the “dissenting opinions of
the law review writers,” and Lindey quipped that “it is a lucky thing for us that
judges and not law review writers sit on the bench.”429 The academic criticism of
Sidis focused on the court’s interpretation of the public figure and public interest

421. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 28–29 (2007) (“In the United States much
more than in most other countries in the nineteenth century, a man could leave his old life behind and
start a new life.”).
422. Id.
423. Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy, supra note 153, at 401.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Feinberg, supra note 107, at 719.
427. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Nov. 18, 1940) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives
Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
428. Id.
429. Letter from Alexander Lindey, Partner, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, to Ik Shuman, Editor,
The New Yorker (Jan. 20, 1941) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and Archives Div.,
N.Y. Pub. Library); Letter from to Ik Shuman, Editor, The New Yorker, to Alexander Lindey, Partner,
Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst (Dec. 13, 1940) (on file with The New Yorker Archives, Manuscripts and
Archives Div., N.Y. Pub. Library).
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privileges. The law review writers were particularly opposed to the Second
Circuit’s conclusion that Sidis was a public figure. “[T]he court virtually decides
that once a person becomes a public figure he remains a public figure for all time,”
observed the Michigan Law Review.430 “That Sidis was a public figure at the time
the article was printed is certainly questionable,” opined the California Law
Review.431 Sidis “was no longer a public figure, unless that distinction, once
achieved, is to be deemed a lifelong honor and curse,” noted the New York Law
Review.432 The court’s failure to hold that “after seventeen years of self-imposed
obscurity the plaintiff had not regained the right that he, or others for him, had
waived when he was a child” “testifies to the cold treatment which, after a half
century of evolution, the right of privacy still suffers at the hands of unsympathetic
courts, lending an indirect and untimely sanction to some abuses of the press.”433
Many legal commentators attacked the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
“matters of public interest” privilege, which they claimed was so deferential to the
press that it was virtually meaningless. As one law review noted: “the news facts
occurred thirty years before and the only factor bringing the plaintiff before the
public was the ‘digging out’ of interesting reading matter for an avid public.”434
“According to this view the court looks to what people are ‘interested in’ in order
to determine what can be written about other people’s private lives. It hardly takes
account of the human frailty to become more interested as the matter becomes more
private.”435 “Public interest may attach to an article in the sense that many persons
are eager to read it. It will not follow from this that its publication . . . will serve a
public interest outweighing the individual distress it may cause,” wrote the New
York Law Review.436 In sharp contrast to civil libertarian strains of free speech
thought, the sentiment from many of the law reviews was that the courts had an
affirmative duty to raise the moral standards of the public by imposing contentbased limitations on popular literature and journalism. “When the court says that
the mores of the times justifies such publication, is it not abdicating from its duty to
improve the mores of the times as far as it can by barring the expression of that
which caters to and develops the less elevated tendencies of men?”437 “The courts
are the final arbiters of what can be printed in magazines and newspapers,” noted
one critic.438 “Will they take upon themselves the burden of raising the standards
of journalism and the mores of the community, or will they let the newspapers and
magazines, prompted by a willing public curiosity, dictate to them the standards of

430. Torts—Right of Privacy—Matters of General or Public Interest, supra note 419, at 503.
431. Recent Decision, supra note 303, at 90.
432. Notes and Comment, supra note 411, at 429.
433. Recent Cases, Torts—Privilege of the Press to Describe Present Life of Former Public
Figure, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 254 (1940).
434. Bartenstein, supra note 400, at 140.
435. Id.
436. Notes and Comment, supra note 411, at 430.
437. Recent Decisions, Torts—Right of Privacy—Biographical Sketch of Former Child Prodigy as
a Matter of Public Concern, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 108, 110–11 (1941).
438. Bartenstein, supra note 400, at 141.
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what can be written about other people?”439
There were a few expressions of support for the Second Circuit decision. Judge
Leon Yankwich, on the District Court for the Southern District of California,
described the outcome in Sidis as a great advance for participatory democracy that,
like contemporaneous developments in libel law, widened the “realm of criticism
and comment” of public figures and public officials.440 The decision was also
“celebrated in . . . publishing circles.”441 Morris Ernst took great satisfaction in the
outcome, both on free speech grounds and as a personal matter—he had grown to
hate Sidis. Reflecting many years later on the case, he wrote that although
“[h]uman sympathy was all in Sidis’s corner,” it was necessary for the court to
“hurt Sidis” in the name “of a greater . . . good.”442
But these favorable opinions were in the minority. The laws of privacy and
public sentiments about privacy were not aligned. Nor were public attitudes
towards privacy consistent. While much of the public appeared to embrace liberal
trends in free speech doctrine that permitted a wider range of expression, at the
same time, many believed that freedom of speech was not a blank check to the
press to expose people’s intimacies and humiliate them when they had done
nothing to deserve it. The public enjoyed reading about others’ private lives in the
media, yet at the same time often felt uneasy and guilty about it. The public
reaction to Sidis exposed these contradictions. It reaffirmed the public’s
commitment to privacy in the midst of a voracious celebrity culture—a culture of
exposure.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE SIDIS LEGACY
The Second Circuit’s decision in Sidis v. F.R. Publishing would go down in
history as a major victory for the press. It destabilized the conceptual foundations
beneath the Warren and Brandeis “right to privacy” and imperiled the viability of
the privacy tort as it had been envisioned at the turn of the century. The court
defined the public figure and public interest privileges expansively and indicated
that anyone could become and remain a public figure so long as the public—or the
press—expressed an interest in him. A right to privacy that permitted judges,
rather than publishers and media consumers, to determine what material was
suitable for public consumption, the court suggested, was anathema to the
principles of freedom of choice and access to information protected by freedom of
speech.443 Against the backdrop of widespread concerns with government
censorship, political accountability and democratic participation, the Second
Circuit concluded that Sidis’s loss of privacy was an unfortunate but inevitable

439. Id.
440. Leon Yankwich, The Protection of Newspaper Comment on Public Men and Public Matters,
11 LA. L. REV. 327, 342 (1951).
441. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 236.
442. MORRIS LEOPOLD ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 186–87
(1962).
443. See supra notes 305, 306, 352, 354, 355 and accompanying text.
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casualty of the public’s right to learn about and discuss the “misfortunes and
frailties of neighbors and ‘public figures.’”444 By offering convincing doctrinal and
normative rationales for public exposures of private life, the Sidis court paved the
legal pathway for the proliferation of increasingly sensationalistic journalism in the
subsequent decades.445
Immediately after the decision, the decision in Sidis was successfully mobilized
by media defendants in a series of cases involving magazine articles, news stories
and films and radio programs that exposed individuals and their personal affairs to
public view. Sidis would be cited for the principle that privileged “matters of
public interest”—sometimes described as “newsworthy material”—are matters that
interest the public, as determined by the press, and that it was in the public’s best
interests to have its curiosities fulfilled. As the Iowa Supreme Court summarized,
Sidis stood for the maxim that “in determining whether an item is newsworthy,
courts cannot impose their own views about what should interest the community.
Courts do not have license to sit as censors.”446 In Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co.,
the Third Circuit in 1958, citing Sidis, upheld a dismissal on summary judgment of
a claim for invasion of privacy in a case involving a lurid article in the pulp
magazine Front Page Detective, noting that “[s]ome readers are attracted by
shocking news. Others are titillated by sex in the news . . . Much news is in
various ways amusing and for that reason of special interest to many people.”447
Such material, titillating and amusing as it was, was privileged as a matter of
“public interest.”448
As new trends towards investigative journalism and realism in reporting led to
more graphic and sensationalistic publications beginning in the 1950s and 1960s,
Sidis was used to justify exposures of private and intimate scenarios that were far
more disturbing than what appeared in The New Yorker. In Bremmer v. Journal
Tribune Publishing Co., a newspaper which carried on its front page a large picture
of a murdered boy’s mutilated and decomposed body was held not to be liable to
the boy’s parents for invasion of privacy.449 The court, referencing Sidis, held that
the boy, though unwillingly, became part of a newsworthy matter of “public
interest”—a matter that the public was curious about—and that the public had a
right to know about the “misfortunes and frailties” of its leaders, heroes, and
victims.450 On the same theory, items that have been held to be privileged “matters
of public interest” in more recent years have included the death of a child in an
unlocked refrigerator; mistaken interpretations of pap smear tests; the birth of a
baby to a twelve-year-old girl; and the specifics of a man’s violent attack by his

444. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
445. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1231 (1993) (Judge Richard Posner
noting that Sidis was “more consonant with modern thinking about the proper balance between the right
of privacy and freedom of the press”).
446. Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302 (Iowa 1979).
447. See Jenkins v. Dell Publ’g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d. Cir. 1958).
448. Id.
449. See Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publ’g Co., 76 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1956).
450. Id. at 765, 767, 768.
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former lover, among other intimate and personal details.451 The “leave it to the
press” method remains the dominant approach to determining the scope of the
“public interest” privilege, and the courts continue to regard media content as the
expression of popular interests.452 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts
summarized, the courts have essentially permitted publishers and broadcasters to
define what is “newsworthy” and “a matter of public interest.”453
Despite the absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling on whether there are
First Amendment limitations on the privacy tort, courts in public disclosure of
private facts cases involving the mass media have, since the 1940s, described the
broad “public interest” privilege as mandated by freedom of speech and press—as
protecting the constitutional “right of the public to be informed”—whether the
information was material about a politician’s home and family life, an article about
a homicide in Official Detective Stories magazine, or an article about pedestrian
safety that included a photo of a child lying on the street after being hit by a car.454
As the Supreme Court of California summarized in 1952, “[t]he right of privacy
does undoubtedly infringe upon absolute freedom of speech and of the press, and it
also clashes with the interest of the public in having a free dissemination of news
and information.”455 Although the Supreme Court has never declared a First
Amendment “right to know,” since Sidis, the capacious “public interest” standard
has been framed in terms of freedom of the press, the public good and the public’s
constitutional right to access the news.
Sidis also stands for the principle that the public figure’s “waiver” of privacy is
potentially indefinite. In 1949, in Cohen v. Marx, a California appeals court
granted a motion to dismiss a claim brought by a professional boxer, Canvasback
Cohen, whose name and story had been broadcasted on NBC long after he had
retired from the ring.456 The court held that as a professional boxer he had
permanently waived his right to privacy and “could not at his will and whim draw
451. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002); Costlow
v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606 (S.C.
1956); Wavell v. Caller-Times Publ’g Co., 809 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App. 1991).
452.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see also Heath v. Playboy Enter.,
Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“[W]hat is newsworthy is primarily a function of the
publisher, not the courts.”); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ’g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 996 (Kan. 1975) (“A
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the
Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”).
In a similar vein, the Oregon Supreme Court in 1986 observed that regardless of whether the press
caters to the public’s preexisting tastes or “creates the demand for shocking, scandalous, pathetic, or
titillating ‘human interest’ news by providing a supply,” the fact remains that people avidly consume the
media, and therefore publishers must be addressing at least some portion of the public’s interests.
Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Co., 712 P.2d 803, 809 (Ore. 1986).
453. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
454. Leverton v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 192 F.2d 974, 977–78 (3d Cir. 1951); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459
P.2d 912, 923–24 (Cal. 1969); Blount v. T.D. Publ’g Corp., 423 P.2d. 421, 423 (N.M. 1966).
455. Gill v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 239 P.2d 630, 633 (Cal. 1952). The “broad privilege cloaking the
truthful publication of all newsworthy matters” was necessary to prevent the privacy tort’s “potential
encroachment on the freedoms of speech and the press,” noted the California Supreme Court in 1969.
Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922; see also Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, 67 P.3d 29 (Idaho 2003).
456. See Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
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himself like a snail into his shell and hold others liable for commenting upon the
acts which had taken place when he had voluntarily exposed himself in the public
eye.”457 In Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, a federal district court, citing Sidis,
held that it was not actionable to publish in a magazine two years after the fact an
account of the plaintiff’s involvement in a homicide, since the plaintiff, a stunt
driver, was a public figure, and “incident[s] in the private life of a public figure”
were almost always matters of “legitimate public interest,” no matter when they
occurred.458 In Smith v. National Broadcasting, a California appeals court
summarized the Sidis principle when it observed that it was “characteristic of . . .
our contemporary world” that events and people “which have caught the popular
imagination have been frequently revivified long after their occurrence in . . .
literature [and] journalism . . . .”459 Therefore, the “mere passage of time” did not
preclude “the publication of incidents from the life of one formerly in the public
eye.”460
In an unusual decision in 1971, the Supreme Court of California held that a man,
Marvin Briscoe, whose criminal activity had been reported in the Reader’s Digest
eleven years after it occurred, had stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy,
observing that,
just as the risk of exposure is a concomitant of urban life, so too is the expectation of
anonymity regained. It would be a crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once
public never becomes private again. Human forgetfulness over time puts today’s
‘hot’ news in tomorrow’s dusty archives. In a nation of 200 million people there is
ample opportunity for all but the most infamous to begin a new life.461

Yet Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association was overturned in a 2004 case
involving a similar factual scenario, Gates v. Discovery Communications, on the
authority of intervening United States Supreme Court cases that held that except
under extreme circumstances, the imposition of liability for the publication of
truthful material that was lawfully obtained violated the First Amendment.462 The
Court’s decisions in Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn and Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Company formalized the intuition of Sidis and its progeny that
freedom of speech discourages, if not substantially prohibits, a right to keep one’s
private affairs out of the media spotlight.463
The legacy of William James Sidis and the Sidis case has been kept alive in
privacy case law, popular culture and the ongoing paradox of privacy: the public’s
penchant for protesting the media’s invasions of privacy while at the same time
enjoying peering into other people’s private lives.464 While the public can be
457. Id. at 320.
458. See Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 545 (D. Conn. 1953).
459. Smith v. Nat’l Broad., 292 P.2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
460. Id.; see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
461. See Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971).
462. See Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
463. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975).
464. As demonstrated, Sidis is a staple of privacy and media law casebooks, and the life story of
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callous when it comes to invading the privacy of public figures, especially
entertainment stars, it continues to demonstrate genuine sympathy for Sidis-like
figures—tragic, vulnerable individuals exploited by the media’s hunger for the
intimate details of personal life—and to protest when it thinks the media have gone
too far. There was an outcry over the media treatment of Princess Diana, whose
pursuit by paparazzi led to her death.465 The press was highly criticized when it
related the story of tennis star Arthur Ashe’s AIDS.466 When a California
newspaper published a photograph of a five-year-old drowning victim, readers and
media critics charged the paper with invading privacy and showing a “callous
disrespect of the victim.”467 Our attitudes towards privacy, publicity and “the right
to know” remain contradictory and inconsistent.
Sidis also remains vivid in academic discussions of privacy and its legal
protection. The scholarly debate continues over whether the Second Circuit wrote
into the law an important theory of “public accountability,” or whether the court
devalued privacy and the injuries inflicted by unwanted public exposure.468 It is
beyond the scope of this article to weigh in on this ongoing dispute; instead, I want
to briefly mention one argument for reconsidering Sidis’s claim—the way in which
new technologies have altered the nature of public memory and the dynamics of
remembering and forgetting. Despite the media’s fascination with “has-beens” and
its penchant for rehashing old news, before the late twentieth century, it was still
possible for a William James Sidis or a Canvasback Cohen or Marvin Briscoe to
one day slip away from the public gaze. The public attention span is generally
short-lived, and unless continually prodded, people will eventually forget. Unless
another media outlet revived interest in the Sidis story after the New Yorker
debacle, it is quite possible that William, had he lived longer, could have enjoyed a
quiet old age in solitude. The law’s failure to recognize a right to revert to
anonymity did not mean, as a practical matter, that one’s private life would forever
remain in the public eye.
The Internet has changed that. In our Web-based culture, virtually everything is
recorded, and information is stored permanently on computer servers and
accessible to the public in an instant. The personal and social implications of this
transformation are immense. The Internet poses a profound, even “existential”
threat to “our ability to control our identities; to preserve the option of reinventing
ourselves and starting anew; to overcome our checkered pasts,” writes legal

William James Sidis is memorialized in popular culture. For example, the 1998 film Good Will Hunting
is said to have been based on his life. See Good Will Sidis, HARV. MAG., Mar. 1998, available at
http://harvardmagazine.com/1998/03/pump.html.
465. See Jacqueline Sharkey, The Diana Aftermath, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov. 1997, at 18.
466. Fred Bruning, How a Private Citizen Lost His Privacy Rights, MACLEAN’S, May 4, 1992, at
13.
467. Candace Cummins Gauthier, Understanding and Respecting Privacy, in JOURNALISM ETHICS:
A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 227 (Christopher Meyers ed., 2010).
468. See, e.g., Post, supra note 21, at 1001; see also SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF
CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 250–58 (1982); KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY
AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 216–17 (1988); Emile Karafiol, The Right to Privacy and the
Sidis Case, 12 GA. L. REV. 513 (1978).
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commentator Jeffrey Rosen.469 A world with a perfect memory, technology scholar
Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger has argued, is a world without the learning,
forgiveness and growth that comes from forgetting and renewal.470 Would a
modern day Sidis have a right to legal recourse if his story was circulated to the
world on the Web or if a blog post from his youth was rediscovered and publicized
two decades later? Probably not; since the era of Sidis, the law has embraced a
commitment to the free flow of news as the paramount virtue of the information
society, where participation in politics and public life is seen as a function of open
access to facts. But in a networked world where there is a surfeit of information—
much of it intimate and personal—in public circulation, and where new
technologies prohibit the kind of natural fading away that could happen in the age
of traditional media, there may be reason to consider a place for the law in policing
the boundaries of the collective memory. The twenty-first century revolution in
information brings new meaning and salience to Sidis’s claim to a legal right to be
forgotten.

469. Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 2010, at 12.
470. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHOENBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE (2009).

